Decomposing trust and trustworthiness

Experimental Economics - Tập 9 - Trang 193-208 - 2006
Nava Ashraf1, Iris Bohnet2, Nikita Piankov3
1Harvard Business School, Boston
2Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge
3Analysis Group, Boston

Tóm tắt

What motivates people to trust and be trustworthy? Is trust solely “calculative,” based on the expectation of trustworthiness, and trustworthiness only reciprocity? Employing a within-subject design, we run investment and dictator game experiments in Russia, South Africa and the United States. Additionally, we measured risk preferences and expectations of return. Expectations of return account for most of the variance in trust, but unconditional kindness also matters. Variance in trustworthiness is mainly accounted for by unconditional kindness, while reciprocity plays a comparatively small role. There exists some heterogeneity in motivation but people behave surprisingly similarly in the three countries studied.

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