A comment on Baron and Ferejohn (1989): The Open Rule Equilibrium and Coalition Formation
Tóm tắt
I present a more general characterization of the symmetric stationary subgame perfect equilibrium to the Baron and Ferejohn (1989) open rule divide-the-dollar game. Specifically, I show that an amender can follow several different randomization strategies when deciding whom to make offers to, and each can be sustained as a distinct equilibrium with slightly different payoffs. The result demonstrates that, when building coalitions in bargaining settings where an offer is already on the table, those with the worst offers need not be the ones “bought up” first.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J.M. Jr., Strauss, A.B., & Ting, M.M. (2005). Voting weights and formateur advantages in the formation of coalition governments. American Journal of Political Science, 49, 550–563.
Baron, D.P., & Ferejohn, J.A. (1989). Bargaining in legislatures. American Political Science Review, 83, 1181–1206.
Eraslan, H. (2002). Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn model. Journal of Economic Theory, 103, 11–30.
Snyder, Jr., James M., Ting, M.M., & Ansolabehere, S. (2005). Legislative bargaining under weighted voting. American Economic Review, 95, 981–1004.