Two Theories of Transparency

Annalen der Philosophie - Tập 86 - Trang 553-573 - 2019
Edward W. Averill1, Joseph Gottlieb1
1Texas Tech University, Lubbock, USA

Tóm tắt

Perceptual experience is often said to be transparent; that is, when we have a perceptual experience we seem to be aware of properties of the objects around us, and never seem to be aware of properties of the experience itself. This is a (purported) introspective fact. It is also often said that we can infer a metaphysical fact from this introspective fact, e.g. a fact about the nature of perceptual experience. A transparency theory fills in the details for these two facts, and bridges the gap between them. We have three aims: to scrutinize Michael Tye’s transparency theory (Noûs 36(1):137–151, 2002; Consciousness revisited: materialism without phenomenal concepts, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2009; Philos Stud 170(1):39–57, 2014a), introduce a new transparency theory, and advance a meta-theoretical hypothesis about the interest, and import, of transparency theories.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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