Public Economies and the Endogenous Choice of Institutions
Tóm tắt
In this paper we provide a framework
in which to formalize the seminal work of Elinor Ostrom on the study of public economies, a prominent theoretical construct aimed at providing answers to the following questions: (1) why are some societies able to solve their collective action problems and others are not? and (2) why do societies choose the particular institutions they choose from a vast array of possible choices?
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