Voting with their feet: institutional ownership changes around forced CEO turnover

Journal of Financial Economics - Tập 68 - Trang 3-46 - 2003
Robert Parrino1, Richard W Sias2, Laura T Starks1
1Department of Finance, University of Texas at Austin, Austin, TX 78712, USA
2Department of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate, Washington State University, Pullman, WA 99164, USA

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