On fair allocations and monetary compensations
Tóm tắt
In this paper we study fair division problems with the special feature that there exists only one transferable good that everyone likes. This good will be used to compensate some individuals for their differences in other non-transferable resources (like talents or handicaps). In this context we test the traditional no-envy solution and we verify that: 1) its ethical content can be a matter of discussion, and 2) frequently it does not select a non-empty set of allocations. We propose an extension of this criterion that partially solves the existence problem while also retaining the main ethical properties of the preceding solution.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Arnsperger, C.: Envy-freeness and distributive justice: a survey of the literature. J. Econ. Surv.8, 155–186 (1994)
Arrow, K. J.: Social choice and individual values, 2nd edn. New York: Wiley 1963
Dworkin, R.: What is equality? Part 2: Equality of resources. Phil. Publ. Affairs10, 283–345 (1981)
Fleurbaey, M.: On fair compensation. Theory Decision36, 277–307 (1994)
Foley, D.: Resource allocation and the public sector. Yale Econ. Essays7, 45–98 (1967)
Ichiishi, T.: Game theory for economic analysis. New York: Academic Press Inc. 1983
Kramer, G. H.: A dynamical model of political equilibrium. J. Econ. Theory16, 310–334 (1977)
Roemer, J.: Equality of resources implies equality of welfare. Q. J. Econ.101, 751–784 (1986)
Roemer, J.: Axiomatic bargaining theory on economic environments. J. Econ. Theory45, 1–35 (1988)
Sen, A. K.: Collective choice and social welfare. San Francisco: Holden-Day 1970
Thomson, W., Varian, H.: Theories of justice based on symmetry. In: Hurwicz, L., Schmeidler, D., Sonnenschein, H. (eds.) Social goals and social organizations. Cambridge University Press 1985
Van Parijs, P.: Equal endowments as undominated diversity. Rech. Econ. Louvain56, 327–355 (1990)