The optimal probability and magnitude of fines for acts that definitely are undesirable

International Review of Law and Economics - Tập 12 - Trang 3-11 - 1992
Louis Kaplow1
1Harvard Law School and the National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

Tài liệu tham khảo

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