Disloyal managers and proxy voting

Admati, 2009, The “Wall Street Walk” and shareholder activism: exit as a form of voice, Rev. Financ. Stud., 22, 2645, 10.1093/rfs/hhp037 Aggarwal, 2019, The power of shareholder votes: evidence from uncontested director elections, J. Financ. Econ., 133, 134, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.12.002 Agrawal, 2012, Corporate governance objectives of labor union shareholders: evidence from proxy voting, Rev. Financ. Stud., 25, 187, 10.1093/rfs/hhr081 Angrist, 2010, The credibility revolution in empirical economics: how better research design is taking the con out of econometrics, J. Econ. Perspect., 24, 3, 10.1257/jep.24.2.3 Appel, 2016, Passive investors, not passive owners, J. Financ. Econ., 121, 111, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2016.03.003 Appel, 2019, Standing on the shoulders of giants: the effect of passive investors on activism, Rev. Financ. Stud., 32, 2720, 10.1093/rfs/hhy106 Ashraf, 2012, Do pension-related business ties influence mutual fund proxy voting? Evidence from shareholder proposals on executive compensation, J. Financ. Quant. Anal., 47, 567, 10.1017/S0022109012000014 Attig, 2012, Institutional investment horizon and investment-cash flow sensitivity, J. Bank. Finance, 36, 1164, 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2011.11.015 Brav, 2020, Picking friends before picking (proxy) fights: how mutual fund voting shapes proxy contests, Working Paper Bushee, 1998, The influence of institutional investors on myopic R&D investment behavior, Account. Rev., 73, 305 Bushee, 2000, Corporate disclosure practices, institutional investors, and stock return volatility, J. Account. Res., 38, 171, 10.2307/2672914 Butler, 2012, Educational networks, mutual fund voting patterns, and CEO compensation, Rev. Financ. Stud., 25, 2533, 10.1093/rfs/hhs067 Cai, 2009, Electing directors, J. Finance, 64, 2389, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2009.01504.x Callen, 2013, Institutional investor stability and crash risk: monitoring versus short-termism?, J. Bank. Finance, 37, 3047, 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.02.018 Calluzzo, 2019, Mutual fund board connections and proxy voting, J. Financ. Econ., 134, 669, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2019.04.012 Chen, 2007, Monitoring: which institutions matter?, J. Financ. Econ., 86, 279, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.09.005 Chou, 2011, Are better governed funds better monitors?, J. Corp. Finance, 17, 1254, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2011.06.008 Crane, 2019, Institutional investor cliques and governance, J. Financ. Econ., 133, 175, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012 Cuñat, 2012, The vote is cast: the effect of corporate governance on shareholder value, J. Finance, 67, 1943, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01776.x Cvijanović, 2016, Ties that bind: how business connections affect mutual fund activism, J. Finance, 71, 2933, 10.1111/jofi.12425 Davis, 2007, Business ties and proxy voting by mutual funds, J. Financ. Econ., 85, 552, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.04.003 Del Guercio, 2008, Do boards pay attention when institutional investor activists “just vote no”?, J. Financ. Econ., 90, 84, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2008.01.002 Dimmock, 2018, Capital gains lock-in and governance choices, J. Financ. Econ., 127, 113, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2017.11.001 Duan, 2016, The role of mutual funds in corporate governance: evidence from mutual funds’ proxy voting and trading behavior, J. Financ. Quant. Anal., 51, 489, 10.1017/S0022109016000181 Eldar, 2020, Common ownership and startup growth, Working paper Ertimur, 2013, Shareholder votes and proxy advisors: evidence from Say on Pay, J. Account. Res., 51, 951, 10.1111/1475-679X.12024 Fich, 2021, Disloyal managers and shareholders’ wealth, Working Paper Fos, 2018, Do director elections matter?, Rev Financ Stud, 31, 1499, 10.1093/rfs/hhx078 Frazzini, 2006, The disposition effect and underreaction to news, J. Finance, 61, 2017, 10.1111/j.1540-6261.2006.00896.x Gaspar, 2005, Shareholder investment horizons and the market for corporate control, J. Financ. Econ., 76, 135, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2004.10.002 Ghaly, 2020, Institutional investors’ horizons and corporate employment decisions, J. Corp. Finance, 64, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101634 Harford, 2018, Do long-term investors improve corporate decision making?, J. Corp. Finance, 50, 424, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.09.022 He, 2019, Internalizing governance externalities: the role of institutional cross-ownership, J. Financ. Econ., 134, 400, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.07.019 Hshieh, 2021, How do passive funds act as active owners? Evidence from mutual fund voting records, J. Corp. Finance, 66, 10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2020.101692 Iliev, P., Kalodimos, J., Lowry, M., Forthcoming. Investors’ attention to corporate governance. Rev. Financ. Stud.. 10.1093/RFS/HHAB003. Iliev, 2015, Are mutual funds active voters?, Rev. Financ. Stud., 28, 446, 10.1093/rfs/hhu062 Kedia, 2021, Institutional investors and hedge fund activism, Rev. Corp. Finance Stud., 10, 1, 10.1093/rcfs/cfaa027 Kim, 2019, Do long-term institutional investors promote corporate social responsibility activities?, J. Bank. Finance, 101, 256, 10.1016/j.jbankfin.2018.11.015 Lancaster, 2000, The incidental parameter problem since 1948, J. Econom., 95, 391, 10.1016/S0304-4076(99)00044-5 Malenko, 2016, The role of proxy advisory firms: evidence from a regression-discontinuity design, Rev. Financ. Stud., 29, 3394, 10.1093/rfs/hhw070 Matvos, 2008, Cross-ownership, returns, and voting in mergers, J. Financ. Econ., 89, 391, 10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.11.004 McCahery, 2016, Behind the scenes: the corporate governance preferences of institutional investors, J. Finance, 71, 2905, 10.1111/jofi.12393 Rauterberg, 2017, Contracting out of the fiduciary duty of loyalty: an empirical analysis of corporate opportunity waivers, Columb. Law Rev., 117, 1075