Harmful competition in insurance markets

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization - Tập 106 - Trang 213-226 - 2014
Giuseppe De Feo1,2, Jean Hindriks3
1Department of Economics, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
2Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali, Università di Pavia, Italy
3CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Tài liệu tham khảo

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