Corporate governance and market valuation of capital and R&D investments
Tóm tắt
In this study, we examine how corporate governance structure affects market valuation of capital and R&D investments. We employ three empirical proxies of corporate governance—analyst following, board composition, and institutional holdings, and study whether market valuation of corporate investments varies with governance structure. Our results show that the market valuation of the firm's capital and R&D investments depends critically on analyst following and board composition, but not on institutional holdings.
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