Is group selection necessary? An alternative interpretation of homogeneous Middleman groups: Comments on Janet Landa’s paper

Journal of Bioeconomics - Tập 10 - Trang 279-285 - 2008
Richard A. Epstein1,2
1The University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, USA
2The Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Stanford, USA

Tóm tắt

This article critiques the efforts by Janet Landa, David Sloan Wilson and others to use group selection paradigms to explain the success of homogenous middlemen groups (HMGs). It argues that group selection theory cannot explain the conflicts of interests that arise within HMGs or why they dissolve in certain occasions. Landa’s earlier explanations, which stressed the combination of genetic (kinship) and social bonds in the creation of trust and cooperation in the extension of credit and the creation of local public goods, better predicts both the strength and weaknesses of HMGs.

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