The Behavioral Foundations of Retaliatory Justice

Journal of Bioeconomics - Tập 7 - Trang 45-72 - 2005
Vincy Fon1, Francesco Parisi2
1Department of Economics, George Washington University, Washington, USA
2George Mason University School of Law, Arlington, USA

Tóm tắt

Norms of positive and negative reciprocity constitute important constraints that affect human behavior. While much attention has been devoted to the economics of reciprocity in cooperation, the stylized fact that humans have a natural predisposition towards negative reciprocity and retaliation has received little consideration in the literature. In this study we investigate the behavioral foundations of retaliatory justice by considering the conditions under which norms of retaliation may constitute instruments for promoting desirable cooperation. The results suggest that human instincts for revenge may an important ingredient for the sustainability of peaceful social behavior.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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