Dynamic optimal insurance and lack of commitment

Review of Economic Dynamics - Tập 18 - Trang 287-305 - 2015
Alexander K. Karaivanov1, Fernando M. Martin2
1Simon Fraser University, Canada
2Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, United States

Tài liệu tham khảo

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