(Un)fair Delegation: Exploring the Strategic Use of Equity Rules in International Climate Negotiations

Springer Science and Business Media LLC - Tập 67 - Trang 505-533 - 2017
Andreas Lange1, Claudia Schwirplies1
1Department of Economics, University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany

Tóm tắt

We provide a new approach for identifying a strategic use of equity arguments in international (climate) negotiations. We first develop a theoretical model of strategic delegation which accounts for both environmental as well as equity preferences. We show that the strategic use of equity arguments qualitatively depends on the extent to which environmental preferences can be misrepresented: representatives from different countries may be expected to have similar equity views rather than widely differing perceptions of a fair share. Based on survey data on climate negotiations, we then provide empirical evidence for differences between equity preferences of citizens from Germany, China, and the U.S. and the perceived view on the position of their respective countries.

Tài liệu tham khảo

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