“Rulers ruled by women”: an economic analysis of the rise and fall of women’s rights in ancient Sparta
Tóm tắt
Until modern times, most women possessed relatively few formal rights. The women of ancient Sparta were a striking exception. Although they could not vote, Spartan women reportedly owned 40 percent of Sparta’s agricultural land, and enjoyed other rights that were equally extraordinary. We offer a simple economic explanation for the Spartan anomaly. The defining moment for Sparta was its conquest of a neighboring land and people, which fundamentally changed the marginal products of Spartan men’s and Spartan women’s labor. To exploit the potential gains from a reallocation of labor—specifically, to provide the appropriate incentives and the proper human capital formation—men granted women property (and other) rights. Consistent with our explanation for the rise of women’s rights, when Sparta lost the conquered land several centuries later, the rights for women disappeared. Two conclusions emerge that may help explain why women’s rights have been so rare for most of history. First, in contrast to the historical norm, the optimal (from the men’s perspective) division of labor among Spartans involved women in work that was not easily monitored by men. Second, the rights held by Spartan women may have been part of an unstable equilibrium, which contained the seeds of its own destruction.
Tài liệu tham khảo
Acemoglu D (2005) Constitutions, politics, and economics: a review essay on Persson and Tabellini’s ‘The economic effect of constitutions’. J Econ Lit 43: 1025–1048
Acemoglu D, Autor DH, Lyle D (2004) Women, war, and wages: the effect of female labor supply on the wage structure at midcentury. J Polit Econ 112: 497–551
Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2000) Why did the west extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality and growth in historical perspective. Q J Econ 115: 1167–1199
Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2001) A theory of political transitions. Am Econ Rev 91: 938–963
Aghion P, Alesina A, Trebbi F (2004) Endogenous political institutions. Q J Econ 119: 565–611
Alchian AA, Demsetz H (1972) Production, information costs, and economic organization. Am Econ Rev 62: 777–797
Alston LJ, Libecap GD, Schneider R (1996) The determinants and impact of property rights: land titles on the Brazilian frontier. J Law Econ Organ 12: 25–61
Anderson TL (1995) Sovereign nations or reservations. Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, San Francisco
Baker M, Miceli TJ (2005) Land inheritance rules: theory and cross-cultural analysis. J Econ Behav Organ 56: 77–102
Balsdon JPVD (1975) Roman women: their history and habits. Greenwood Press, Westport
Barzel Y (1989) Economic analysis of property rights. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
Barzel Y (1992) Confiscation by the ruler: the rise and fall of Jewish lending in the middle ages. J Law Econ 35: 1–13
Barzel Y (2000) Property rights and the evolution of the state. Econ Gov 1: 25–51
Bean R (1973) War and the birth of the nation state. J Econ Hist 33: 203–221
Beard CA (1913) An economic interpretation of the Constitution of the United States. The Free Press, New York, p 1965
Becker GS (1991) A treatise on the family. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Bernheim BD, Shleifer A, Summers LH (1985) The strategic bequest motive. J Pol Econ 93: 1045–1076
Blundell S (1995) Women in ancient Greece. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Boatwright MT, Gargola DJ, Talbert RJA (2004) The Romans: from village to empire. Oxford University Press, New York
Boserup E (1990) Economic and demographic relationships in development. The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Botticini M, Siow A (2003) Why dowries?. Am Econ Rev 93: 1385–1398
Braunstein E, Folbre N (2001) To honor and obey: efficiency, inequality, and patriarchal property rights. Fem Econ 7: 25–44
Cartledge P (1987) Agesilaos and the crisis of Sparta. Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore
Cartledge P (1989) Hellenistic and Roman Sparta. Routledge Press, London
Cartledge P (1998) War and peace. In: Cartledge P(eds) The Cambridge illustrated history of ancient Greece.. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 167–192
Cartledge P (2001) Spartan reflections. University of California Press, Berkeley
Cartledge P (2003) The Spartans. Overlook Press, New York
Crawford M (1993) The Roman republic. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
Fisher N (1998) Work and leisure. In: Cartledge P(eds) The Cambridge illustrated history of ancient Greece.. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 193–219
Fleck RK (2000) When should market-supporting institutions be established?. J Law Econ Organ 16: 129–154
Fleck RK, Hanssen FA (2006) The origins of democracy: a model with application to ancient Greece. J Law Econ 49: 115–146
Forrest WG (1969) A history of Sparta 950–192 B.C Norton,
Freeman C (1999) The Greek achievement. Allen Lane Penguin Press, New York
Galor O, Weil DN (1996) The gender gap, fertility, and growth. Am Econ Rev 86: 374–387
Geddes R, Lueck D (2002) The gains from self-ownership and the expansion of women’s rights. Am Econ Rev 92: 1079–1092
Goldin C (1986) Monitoring costs and occupational segregation by sex: a historical analysis. J Labor Econ 4: 1–27
Goldin CD (1991) The role of World War II in the rise of women’s employment. Am Econ Rev 81: 741–756
Goldin C, Katz LF (2002) The power of the pill: oral contraceptives and women’s career and marriage decisions. J Pol Econ 110: 730–770
Greenwood J, Seshadri A, Vanderbroucke G (2005) The baby boom and the baby bust. Am Econ Rev 95: 183–207
Greif A (1993) Contract enforceability and economic institutions in early trade: the Maghribi traders’ coalition. Am Econ Rev 83: 525–548
Greif A (1994) On the political foundations of the late medieval commercial revolution: Genoa during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. J Econ Hist 54: 271–287
Greif A, Milgrom P, Weingast BR (1994) Coordination, commitment, and enforcement: the case of the merchant guild. J Pol Econ 102: 745–776
Grossman SJ, Hart OD (1986) The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration. J Pol Econ 94: 691–719
Hansen MH (2006) Polis: an introduction to the ancient Greek city–state. Oxford University Press, New York
Hanson VD (1983) Warfare and agriculture in classical Greece. Girding Editor e Stampatori, Pisa
Hanson VD (1999) The other Greeks: the family farm and the agrarian roots of western civilization. University of California Press, Berkeley
Hanssen FA (2004) Is there a politically optimal level of judicial independence?. Am Econ Rev 94: 712–729
Harris W (2003) Archilocus: first poet after Homer. Manuscript, Middlebury College, Middlebury
Hart O, Moore J (1990) Property rights and the nature of the firm. J Pol Econ 98: 1119–1158
Hodkinson S (2000) Property and wealth in ancient Sparta. Gerald Duckworth and Co., London
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) (2005) Women: still the key to food and nutrition security.http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib33.pdf http://www.ifpri.org/pubs/ib/ib33.pdf
Jameson MH (1992) Agricultural labor in ancient Greece. In: Wells B (ed) Agriculture in ancient Greece, Stockholm: proceedings of the 7th international symposium at the Swedish Institute at Athens, pp 135–146
Katz MA (1998) Women, children, and men. In: Cartledge P(eds) The Cambridge illustrated history of ancient Greece.. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 100–138
Keppie L (1984) The making of the Roman army: from republic to empire. Routledge Press, London
Kiser E, Barzel Y (1991) The origins of democracy in England. Ration Soc 3: 396–422
Knack S, Keefer P (1997a) Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-country investigation. Q J Econ 112: 1251–1288
Knack S, Keefer P (1997b) Why don’t poor countries catch up? A cross-national test of an institutional explanation. Econ Inq 35: 590–602
Lacey WK (1968) The family in classical Greece. Cornell University Press, Ithaca
Le Glay M, Voisin JL, Bohec YL (2001) A history of Rome. Blackwell, Malden
Levy B, Spiller PT (1994) The institutional foundations of regulatory commitment: a comparative analysis of telecommunications regulation. J Law Econ Organ 10: 201–246
Lipset SM (1959) Some social requisites of democracy: economic development and political legitimacy. Am J Pol Sci 53: 69–105
Lizzeri A, Persico A (2004) Why did the elites extend the suffrage? Democracy and the scope of government, with an application to Britain’s ‘age of reform’. Q Econ 119: 707–765
Llavador H, Oxoby RJ (2005) Partisan competition, growth, and the franchise. Q J Econ 120: 1155–1189
Londregan JB, Poole KT (1996) Does high income promote democracy?. World Polit 49: 1–30
Lundberg S, Pollak RA (1996) Bargaining and distribution in marriage. J Econ Perspect 10: 139–158
MacKay CS (2004) Ancient Rome: a military and political history. Cambridge University Press, New York
McGuire MC, Olson M (1996) The economics of autocracy and majority rule: the invisible hand and the use of force. J Econ Lit 34: 72–96
Milgrom P, Roberts J (1992) Economics, organization, and management. Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs
Mill JS (1869) The subjection of women. In: Three essays by John Stuart Mill. Oxford University Press, London (reprinted 1971)
Mulligan CB (1998) Pecuniary incentives to work in the United States during World War II. J Pol Econ 106: 1033–1077
Murray O (1993) Early Greece. Harvard University Press, Cambridge
North DC (1990) Institutions, institutional change and economic performance. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
North DC (1993) Institutions and credible commitment. J Inst Theor Econ 149: 11–23
North DC, Weingast BR (1989) Constitutions and commitment: the evolution of institutions governing public choice in seventeenth century England. J Econ Hist 49: 803–832
Olson M (1993) Dictatorship, democracy, and development. Am Pol Sci Rev 87: 567–576
Persson T, Tabellini G (2003) The economic effects of constitutions. MIT Press, Cambridge
Pollak RA (1985) A transaction cost approach to families and households. J Econ Lit 23: 581–608
Pomeroy SB (1975) Goddesses, whores, wives, and slaves: women in classical antiquity. Shocken Books, New York
Pomeroy SB (2002) Spartan women. Oxford University Press, New York
Pomeroy SB, Burstein SM, Donlan W, Tolbert Roberts J (1999) Ancient Greece: a political, social, and cultural history. Oxford University Press, New York
Semple EC (1921) Geographic factors in the ancient Mediterranean grain trade. Ann Assoc Am Geogr 11: 47–74
Shipley G (2004) Lakedaimon. In: Hansen MI, Nielsen TH(eds) An inventory of archaic and classical poleis.. Oxford University Press, New York
Syme R (1979) The Roman revolution. Oxford University Press, New York
Ticchi D, Vindigni A (2003) Endogenous constitutions. IIES seminar paper no 726
Ticchi D, Vindigni A (2006) On wars and political development: the role of international conflicts in the democratization of the west. Center on institutions and governance working paper no. 11. Institute of Governmental Studies, University of California, Berkeley
Webster G (1979) The Roman imperial army. Harper and Row, New York
Weingast BR (1993) Constitutions as governance structures: the political foundations of secure markets. J Inst and Theor Econ 149: 286–311
Weingast BR (1995) The economic role of political institutions: market preserving federalism and economic development. J Law Econ Organ 11: 1–31
Weingast BR (1997) The political foundations of democracy and the rule of law. Am Pol Sci Rev 91: 245–263
Wittman D (2000) The wealth and size of nations. J Conflict Resolut 44: 868–884
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (2005) Global monitoring report. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank, Washington, DC. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GLOBALMONITORINGEXT/Resources/complete.pdf
Zorn JR (1994) Estimating the population size of ancient settlements: methods, problems, solutions, and a case study. Bull Am Schools Orient Res 295: 31–48