[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"_public_publisher_byId_22e791f7-fd3b-4553-8535-67239a99abaa":3,"_public_publication_all{\"sortAscending\":false,\"sortField\":\"updateTime\",\"page\":0,\"size\":10,\"facet\":true,\"searchKey\":\"publisherId:22e791f7-fd3b-4553-8535-67239a99abaa,\"}":107},{"code":4,"data":5,"meta":22},"SUCCESS",{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":9,"slug":10,"properties":11,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":24,"manageAffiliations":31,"indexDatabases":47,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":82,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},"22e791f7-fd3b-4553-8535-67239a99abaa","2024-04-06T01:24:20.004+00:00","2025-11-21T10:01:35.048+00:00",[],"Experimental-Economics",{"eissn":12,"issn":14,"title":16,"url":18},{"VOID":13},"13864157",{"VOID":15},"15736938",{"EN":17},"Experimental Economics",{"VOID":19},"https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Fjournal\u002F10683","PUBLISHER","PENDING",null,0,[25],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":27,"label":28,"description":30,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},"08b972f4-cb35-4757-894c-91738d4809ae",[],{"EN":29},"Economics, Econometrics and Finance (miscellaneous)",{},[32,40],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":34,"slug":22,"properties":35,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":38,"statistic":22},"1553eaa4-de45-4fd0-9ca3-a7b44788e9e7",[],{"title":36},{"EN":37},"Springer New York",[39],"9a7c7208-b28a-42c2-a634-5a7f90eee3ab",{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":42,"slug":22,"properties":43,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":46,"statistic":22},"26a19206-5cad-4456-bb2f-49abd254fbc6",[],{"title":44},{"EN":45},"SPRINGER",[],[48,65],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":50,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":63,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},"83ce4f04-9b54-4c86-9d77-5aaf349239a5",{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":52,"label":53,"description":55,"key":58,"publicationTags":59,"standard":22},"a8273be3-1221-4f26-949d-71dc71ff1fc3",[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},"ISI-SSCI -  Social Sciences Citation Index",{"EN":56,"VI":57},"SSCI database","Cơ sở dữ liệu SSCI","ssci",[60,61],"SSCI","ISI","https:\u002F\u002Fmjl.clarivate.com\u002Fsearch-results?issn=1386-4157",[64],"e6615e52-7101-4709-88aa-c668c4abfe9a",{"id":66,"indexDatabase":67,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":79,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},"0e3ff9dd-c582-4e0c-a7df-f671cbb6b14f",{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":69,"label":70,"description":72,"key":74,"publicationTags":75,"standard":22},"3c7051d4-eb7d-4c57-a56b-36fc74c5d1e9",[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},"Scopus - Elsevier",{"EN":71,"VI":73},"Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus thuộc Elsevier","scopus",[76],"SCOPUS","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.scopus.com\u002Fsourceid\u002F28527","2000,2003-2024",[80],"132d7d6b-3b90-4741-8481-9112a0f44e9a","SCOPUS__Q1",{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":83,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":85,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":104,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":105,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},439,{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},9,5,6,8,18,13,23,11,19,28,17,16,29,27,20,32,21,1,{},{},"JOURNAL",{"meta":108,"data":110},{"total":109},"556",[111,243,353,457,570,671,782,936,1238,1523],{"id":112,"createTime":113,"updateTime":114,"relativeEntities":115,"slug":116,"properties":117,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":113,"verifyNote":129,"languages":130,"translateLanguages":132,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":134,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":135,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":156,"citationCount":206,"citationInfo":207,"publishDate":223,"publishYear":208,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":22,"indexDatabases":224,"openAccess":22,"references":225,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"740ee8f7-93a6-46b1-a933-ef9dad3014d8","2025-01-29T06:27:26.010+00:00","2026-09-12T13:11:18.201+00:00",[],"z-Tree-Zurich-toolbox-for-ready-made-economic-experiments",{"openalex":118,"mag":120,"title":122,"doi":125},{"VOID":119},"W2149961401",{"VOID":121},"2149961401",{"EN":123,"VI":124},"z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments","z-Tree: Hộp công cụ Zurich cho các thực nghiệm kinh tế làm sẵn",{"VOID":126},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-9159-4","PUBLICATION","VERIFIED","Auto Verify",[131],"EN",[133],"VI","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-9159-4",[136],{"id":137,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":138,"affiliations":139,"properties":148,"displayName":152,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"0228479c-8008-41e4-bd02-bee0ca643742",[],[140],{"id":141,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":142,"properties":22},"81c4fc61-0a77-4bff-bc8d-d15c47e41e67",{"id":141,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":143,"slug":22,"properties":144,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":147,"statistic":22},[],{"title":145},{"EN":146},"Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Blümlisalpstrasse 10, CH-8006, Zurich, Switzerland",[],{"orcid":149,"title":151,"openalex":153},{"VOID":150},"https:\u002F\u002Forcid.org\u002F0000-0002-5115-8815",{"EN":152},"Urs Fischbacher",{"VOID":154},"A5065933751","ARTICLE",{"url":22,"publisher":157,"properties":199},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":158,"slug":10,"properties":159,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":163,"manageAffiliations":168,"indexDatabases":179,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":194,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":160,"title":161,"eissn":162},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[164],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":165,"label":166,"description":167,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[169,174],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":170,"slug":22,"properties":171,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":173,"statistic":22},[],{"title":172},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":175,"slug":22,"properties":176,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":178,"statistic":22},[],{"title":177},{"EN":45},[],[180,187],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":181,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":186,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":182,"label":183,"description":184,"key":58,"publicationTags":185,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":188,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":193,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":189,"label":190,"description":191,"key":74,"publicationTags":192,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":195,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":196,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":197,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":198,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"issue":200,"pages":202,"volume":204},{"VOID":201},"2",{"VOID":203},"171-178",{"VOID":205},"10",9751,{"total":206,"publishYear":208,"statisticByYear":209},2007,{"2012":210,"2013":211,"2014":212,"2015":213,"2016":214,"2017":215,"2018":216,"2019":217,"2020":218,"2021":219,"2022":220,"2023":221,"2024":222},609,659,729,745,677,715,681,663,565,573,460,410,294,"2007-06-01",[60,81],[226,229,233,236,239],{"id":22,"text":227,"url":22,"identifiers":228},"Abbink, K., & Abdolkarim, S. (1995). RatImage—research assistance toolbox for computer-aided human behavior experiments. SFB 303 Discussion Paper B-325, University of Bonn.",{},{"id":22,"text":230,"url":22,"identifiers":231},"Falkinger, J., Fehr, E., Gächter, S., & Winter-Ebmer, R. (2000). A simple mechanism for the efficient provision of public goods: Experimental evidence. American Economic Review, 90, 247–264.",{"doi":232},"10.1257\u002Faer.90.1.247",{"id":22,"text":234,"url":22,"identifiers":235},"Fischbacher, U. (1999). z-Tree. Toolbox for readymade economic experiments. IEW Working paper 21, University of Zurich.",{},{"id":22,"text":237,"url":22,"identifiers":238},"Kirchkamp, O. (2004). WWW experiments for economists, a technical introduction. http:\u002F\u002Fwww.kirchkamp.de\u002Fresearch\u002Fwebexp.html, accessed at March 29, 2006.",{},{"id":22,"text":240,"url":22,"identifiers":241},"Plott, C. R. (1991). A computerized laboratory market system for research support systems for the multiple unit double auction. Social Science Working Paper 783. Pasadena: California Inst. Tech.",{},false,{"id":244,"createTime":245,"updateTime":246,"relativeEntities":247,"slug":248,"properties":249,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":260,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":261,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":262,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":301,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":349,"publishYear":350,"citationAnalyzeStatus":351,"lastCitationAnalyze":246,"indexDatabases":352,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"d2ad1fbf-7e0f-4e26-8171-038876df5c72","2023-12-25T08:45:52.193+00:00","2026-08-19T03:41:06.329+00:00",[],"Status-and-the-demand-for-visible-goods-experimental-evidence-on-conspicuous-consumption",{"abstract":250,"title":252,"gsPaper":254,"references":256,"doi":258},{"EN":251},"Some economists argue that consumption of publicly visible goods is driven by social status. Making a causal inference about this claim is difficult with observational data. We conduct an experiment in which we vary both whether a purchase of a physical product is publicly visible or kept private and whether the income used for purchase is linked to social status or randomly assigned. Making consumption choices visible leads to a large increase in demand when income is linked to status, but not otherwise. We investigate the characteristics that mediate this effect and estimate its impact on welfare.",{"EN":253},"Status and the demand for visible goods: experimental evidence on conspicuous consumption",{"VOID":255},"[]",{"VOID":257},"Andreoni, J., & Bernheim, B. D. (2009). Social image and the 50–50 norm: A theoretical and experimental analysis of audience effects. Econometrica, 77, 1607–1636.\nAndreoni, J., & Petrie, R. (2004). Public goods experiments without confidentiality: A glimpse into fund-raising. Journal of Public Economics, 88, 1605–1623.\nAriely, D., Bracha, A., & Meier, S. (2009). Doing good or doing well? Image motivation and monetary incentives in behaving prosocially. American Economic Review, 90, 544–555.\nBagwell, L. S., & Bernheim, B. D. (1996). Veblen effects in a theory of conspicuous consumption. American Economic Review, 86, 349–373.\nBenabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2006). Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review, 99, 544–555.\nBenjamin, D. J., Heffetz, O., Kimball, M. S., & Rees-Jones, A. (2012). What do you think would make you happier? What do you think you would choose? American Economic Review, 102, 2083–2110.\nBracha, A., & Vesterlund, L. (2017). Mixed signals: Charity reporting when donations signal generosity and income. Games and Economic Behavior, 104, 24–42.\nCason, T. N., Masters, W. A., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2010). Entry into winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests: An experimental study. Journal of Public Economics, 94, 604–611.\nCharles, K. K., Hurst, E., & Roussanov, N. (2009). Conspicuous consumption and race. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 124, 425–467.\nCharness, G., Masclet, D., & Villeval, M. C. (2013). The dark side of competition for status. Management Science, 60, 38–55.\nCharness, G., & Rabin, M. (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple tests. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817–869.\nCrawford, V., & Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission. Econometrica, 50, 1431–1452.\nCroson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature, 47, 448–474.\nDechenaux, E., Kovenock, D., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2015). A survey of experimental research on contests, all-pay auctions and tournaments. Experimental Economics, 18, 609–669.\nDohmen, T., & Falk, A. (2011). Performance pay and multidimensional sorting: Productivity, preferences, and gender. American Economic Review, 101, 556–590.\nDuesenberry, J. (1949). Income, saving, and the theory of consumer behavior. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nFeltovich, N., Harbaugh, R., & To, T. (2002). Too cool for school? Signaling and countersignalling. RAND Journal of Economics, 33, 630–649.\nFrank, R. H. (1999). Luxury fever: Money and happiness in an era of excess. New York: The Free Press.\nFrank, R. H. (2008). Should public policy respond to positional externalities? Journal of Public Economics, 92, 1777–1786.\nFrederick, S. (2005). Cognitive reflection and decision making. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 19, 25–42.\nGlaeser, E. L., Gottlieb, J. D., & Ziv, O. (2016). Unhappy cities. Journal of Labor Economics, 34, 129–182.\nGlazer, A., & Konrad, K. A. (1996). A signaling explanation for charity. American Economic Review, 86, 1019–1028.\nGrinblatt, M., Keloharju, M., & Ikäheimo, S. (2008). Social influence and consumption: Evidence from the automobile purchases of neighbors. Review of Economics and Statistics, 90, 735–753.\nHeffetz, O. (2011). A test of conspicuous consumption: Visibility and income elasticities. Review of Economics and Statistics, 93, 1101–1117.\nHeffetz, O., & Frank, R. (2011). Preferences for Status: Evidence and Economic Implications. In A. Bisin, M. Jackson, & J. Benhabib (Eds.), Handbook of Social Economics. Amsterdam: North-Holland.\nHolt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92, 1644–1655.\nHopkins, E., & Kornienko, T. (2004). Running to keep in the same place: Consumer choice as a game of status. American Economic Review, 94, 1085–1107.\nHuberman, B. A., Loch, C. H., & Önçüler, A. (2004). Status as a valued resource. Social Psychology Quarterly, 67, 103–114.\nKahneman, D., Diener, E., & Schwarz, N. (1999). Well-being: The foundations of hedonic psychology. New York: Russell Sage Found.\nKarlan, D., & McConnell, M. A. (2014). Hey look at me: The effect of giving circles on giving. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 106, 402–412.\nKimball, M.S., & Willis, R. (2006). Utility and happiness. Unpublished Manuscript.\nKosfeld, M., & Neckermann, S. (2011). Getting more work for nothing? Symbolic awards and worker performance. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 3, 86–99.\nKuhn, P., Kooreman, P., Soetevent, A., & Kapteyn, A. (2011). The effects of lottery prizes on winners and their neighbors: Evidence from the Dutch postcode lottery. American Economic Review, 101, 2226–2247.\nLeibenstein, H. (1950). Bandwagon, snob, and Veblen effects in the theory of consumers’ demand. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 64, 183–207.\nNiederle, M., & Vesterlund, L. (2007). Do women shy away from competition? Do men compete too much? Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1067–1101.\nPan, X. S., & Houser, D. (2011). Competition for trophies triggers male generosity. PLoS ONE, 6(4), e18050.\nRavina, E. (2007). Habit formation and keeping up with the Joneses: Evidence from micro data. Working paper.\nRoyston, P., & Altman, D. G. (1994). Regression using fractional polynomials of continuous covariates: Parsimonious parametric modelling. Applied Statistics, 43, 429–467.\nSamek, A. S., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014). Recognizing contributors: An experiment on public goods. Experimental Economics, 17, 673–690.\nSamek, A. S., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2017). Selective recognition: How to recognize donors to increase charitable giving. Economic Inquiry, 55, 1489–1496.\nSeltzer, N. (2009). 1,014 GRE practice questions. Princeton Review.\nSheremeta, R.M. (2016). Impulsive behavior in competition: Testing theories of overbidding in rent-seeking contests. Working Paper.\nSivanathan, N., & Pettit, N. C. (2010). Protecting the self through consumption: Status goods as affirmational commodities. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 564–570.\nSmith, A. 1776. The Wealth of Nations. Reprint 1976. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.\nSoetevent, A. (2005). Anonymity in giving in a natural context—a field experiment in 30 churches. Journal of Public Economics, 89, 2301–2323.\nSpence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87, 355–374.\nVeblen, T. (1899). The theory of the leisure class: An economic study in the evolution of institutions. Reprint 2009. New York: Macmillan.",{"VOID":259},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-017-9556-x","2024-09-05T05:51:47.641+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-017-9556-x",[263,279],{"id":264,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":265,"affiliations":267,"properties":276,"displayName":278,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"85a2fb7c-a47a-4118-98a0-49c3c29bb6d3",[266],"AUTHOR",[268],{"id":269,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":270,"properties":22},"2c6cd168-caba-4d7d-89e8-bca1326185b9",{"id":269,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":271,"slug":22,"properties":272,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":275,"statistic":22},[],{"title":273},{"EN":274},"Weatherhead School of Management, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, USA",[],{"title":277},{"VI":278},"David Clingingsmith",{"id":280,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":281,"affiliations":282,"properties":298,"displayName":300,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"a91cf4c5-8cd5-4b9c-ac92-931664014200",[266],[283,289],{"id":269,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":284,"properties":22},{"id":269,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":285,"slug":22,"properties":286,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":288,"statistic":22},[],{"title":287},{"EN":274},[],{"id":290,"sortIndex":103,"affiliation":291,"properties":297},"a4c13192-871f-47a7-9184-687e1c39ed71",{"id":290,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":292,"slug":22,"properties":293,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":296,"statistic":22},[],{"title":294},{"EN":295},"Economic Science Institute, Chapman University, Orange, USA",[],{},{"title":299},{"VI":300},"Roman M. Sheremeta",{"url":261,"publisher":302,"properties":344},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":303,"slug":10,"properties":304,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":308,"manageAffiliations":313,"indexDatabases":324,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":339,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":305,"title":306,"eissn":307},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[309],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":310,"label":311,"description":312,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[314,319],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":315,"slug":22,"properties":316,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":318,"statistic":22},[],{"title":317},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":320,"slug":22,"properties":321,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":323,"statistic":22},[],{"title":322},{"EN":45},[],[325,332],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":326,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":331,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":327,"label":328,"description":329,"key":58,"publicationTags":330,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":333,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":338,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":334,"label":335,"description":336,"key":74,"publicationTags":337,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":340,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":341,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":342,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":343,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":345,"volume":347},{"VOID":346},"877-904",{"VOID":348},"21","2017-11-15",2017,"ERROR_IN_GET_PLATFORM_ID",[60,81],{"id":354,"createTime":355,"updateTime":356,"relativeEntities":357,"slug":358,"properties":359,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":370,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":371,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":372,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":403,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":451,"publishDate":454,"publishYear":452,"citationAnalyzeStatus":455,"lastCitationAnalyze":356,"indexDatabases":456,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"a59bddbc-e2a0-4667-8156-55b35f46a318","2024-02-13T19:10:36.485+00:00","2026-07-29T13:47:22.221+00:00",[],"Self-control-commitment-and-peer-pressure-a-laboratory-experiment",{"abstract":360,"title":362,"gsPaper":364,"references":366,"doi":368},{"EN":361},"This paper focuses on the relationship between individual self-control and peer pressure. To this end, we performed a laboratory experiment that proceeded in two parts. The first part involved an individual real-effort task in which subjects could commit themselves to a particular level of performance while being tempted by an alternative recreational activity. The second part consisted of bargaining in a power-to-take game in which previously earned revenues were at stake. The experimental treatments involved variations in the available information provided to peers about previous individual behavior. The results show that many subjects make a serious commitment. Further, the subsequent revelation of commitment level induces subjects to increase the credible components of their commitment decisions. Past individual behaviors also play a role in bargaining because (i) partners who have committed themselves benefit from lower rates of both take and destruction and (ii) partners who have succumbed to temptation suffer from higher rates of both take and destruction.",{"EN":363},"Self-control, commitment and peer pressure: a laboratory experiment",{"VOID":365},"[\"187005458750372877\"]",{"VOID":367},"Ajzen, I. (2002). Perceived behavioral control, self-efficacy, locus of control, and the theory of planned behavior. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 32(4), 665–683. doi:10.1111\u002Fj.1559-1816.2002.tb00236.x.\nAmeriks, J., Caplin, A., Leahy, J., Tyler, T. (2007). Measuring self-control problems. American Economic Review, 97(3), 966–972. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Faea\u002Faecrev\u002Fv97y2007i3p966-972.html.\nAriely, D., & Wertenbroch, K. (2002). Procrastination, deadlines, and performance: Self-control by precommitment. Psychological Science, 13(3), 219–224.\nAshraf, N., Karlan, D., Yin, W. (2006). Tying odysseus to the mast: Evidence from a commitment savings product in the Philippines. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 121(2), 635–672. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Ftpr\u002Fqjecon\u002Fv121y2006i2p635-672.html.\nBattaglini, M., Benabou, R., & Tirole, J. (2005). Self-control in peer groups. Journal of Economic Theory, 123(2), 105–134.\nBlanco, M., Engelmann, D., & Normann, H. T. (2011). A within-subject analysis of other-regarding preferences. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 321–338.\nBosman, R., van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment. Economic Journal, 112(476), 147–169. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Fecj\u002Feconjl\u002Fv112y2002i476p147-169.html.\nBosman, R., Sutter, M., van Winden, F. (2005). The impact of real effort and emotions in the power-to-take game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 26(3), 407–429. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Feee\u002Fjoepsy\u002Fv26y2005i3p407-429.html.\nBradfield, M., & Aquino, K. (1999). The effects of blame attribution and offender likableness on forgiveness and revenge in the workplace. Journal of Management, 25(5), 607–631.\nBrown, J., & Rachlin, H. (1999). Self-control and social cooperation. Behavioral Process, 47(2), 65–72.\nBucciol, A., Houser, D., & Piovesan, M. (2011). Temptation and productivity: A field experiment with children. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 78(1–2), 126–136.\nBuechel, B., Mechtenberg, L., Petersen, J. (2014). Peer effects and students’ self-control. MPRA Paper 53658, University Library of Munich, Germany. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fp\u002Fpra\u002Fmprapa\u002F53658.html.\nBurger, N., Charness, G., Lynham, J. (2008). Three field experiments on procrastination and willpower. Technical Report 122247000000002399, Levine’s Working Paper Archive. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fp\u002Fcla\u002Flevarc\u002F122247000000002399.html.\nCamerer, C. F., & Malmendier, U. (2007). Behavioral organizational economics. In Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen (Eds.), Behavioral economics and its applications. Princeton: Princeton University Press.\nCharness, G., & Levine, D. (2010). When is employee retaliation acceptable at work? evidence from quasi-experiments. Industrial Relations, 49(4), 499–523.\nCorgnet, B., Hernán-González, R., Rassenti, S. (2013). Peer pressure and moral hazard in teams: Experimental evidence. Working Papers 13–01, Economic Science Institute, Chapman University. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fp\u002Fchu\u002Fwpaper\u002F13-01.html.\nCorgnet, B., Hernán-González, R., Schniter, E. (2014). Why real leisure really matters: Incentive effects on real effort in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, doi:10.1007\u002Fs10683-014-9401-4.\nCortina, L., & Magley, V. (2003). Raising voice, risking retaliation: Events following mistreatment in the workplace. Journal of Occupational Health Psychology, 8(4), 247–265.\nDiamond, P., Vartiainen, H. (2007). Introduction to behavioral economics and its applications. In P. Diamond, H. Vartiainen (Eds.), Behavioral economics and its applications, Introductory Chapters, Princeton: PrincetonUniversity Press. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fh\u002Fpup\u002Fchapts\u002F8437-1.html.\nFalk, A., & Ichino, A. (2006). Clean evidence on peer effects. Journal of Labor Economics, 24(1), 39–58.\nFehr, E., & Schmidt, K. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.\nFischbacher, U. (2007). Z-tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.\nGill, D., Prowse, V. (2012). A structural analysis of disappointment aversion in a real effort competition. American Economic Review 102(1):469–503, doi:10.1257\u002Faer.102.1.469. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ingentaconnect.com\u002Fcontent\u002Faea\u002Faer\u002F2012\u002F00000102\u002F00000001\u002Fart00015.\nGintis, H. (2005). Behavioral game theory and contemporary economic theory. Analyse and Kritik, 27(1), 6–47.\nGreiner, B. (2004). The online recruitment system orsee: A guide for the organization of experiments in economics. Papers on Strategic Interaction 2003–10, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.\nHeckman, J. J. (1979). Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47(1), 153–61. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Fecm\u002Femetrp\u002Fv47y1979i1p153-61.html.\nHiggins, G., & Makin, D. (2004). Self-control, deviant peers, and software piracy. Psychological Reports, 95(3), 921–931.\nHouser, D., Schunk, D., Winter, J., Xiao, E. (2010). Temptation, commitment and self-control in the laboratory. Technical Representative 488, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fp\u002Fzur\u002Fiewwpx\u002F488.html.\nHouser, D., Montinari, N., Piovesan, M. (2012). Private and public decisions in social dilemmas: Evidence from children’s behavior. PLoS One 7(8), e41,568. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fideas.repec.org\u002Fp\u002Fgms\u002Fwpaper\u002F1034.html.\nKandel, E., Lazear, E.P. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal of Political Economy 100(4), 801–817. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Fucp\u002Fjpolec\u002Fv100y1992i4p801-17.html.\nKirk, U., Downar, J., Montague, P.R. (2011). Interoception drives increased rational decision-making in meditators playing the ultimatum game. Frontiers in neuroscience 5, DOI10.3389\u002Ffnins.2011.00049. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\u002Fpubmed\u002F21559066.\nKnoch, D., Pascual-Leoner, A., Meyer, K., Treyer, V., & Fehr, E. (2006). Diminishing reciprocal fairness by disrupting the right prefrontal cortex. Science, 314(5800), 829–832.\nLieberman, M. D. (2010). Social cognitive neuroscience. In S. T. Fiske & G. L. D. T. Gilbert (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., pp. 143–193). New York: McGraw-Hill.\nLocke, E.A., Latham, G.P. (2002). Building a practically useful theory of goal setting and task motivation. A 35-year odyssey. The American Psychologist 57(9), 705–717. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.view.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov\u002Fpubmed\u002F12237980.\nLoewenstein, G. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65(3), 272–292, http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Feee\u002Fjobhdp\u002Fv65y1996i3p272-292.html.\nLoewenstein, G., & O’Donoghue, T. (2007). The heat of the moment: Modeling interactions between affect and deliberation. New York: Mimeo.\nMasclet, D., Noussair, C., Tucker, S., Villeval, M.C. (2003). Monetary and non monetary punishment in the voluntary contributions mechanism. American Economic Review 93(1), 366–380. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Faea\u002Faecrev\u002Fv93y2003i1p366-380.html.\nOlfeo (2014). La réalité de l’utilisation d’internet au bureau, Etude Olfeo 2014.\nRachlin, H. (2000). The science of self-control. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.\nReuben, E., van Winden, F. (2010). Fairness perceptions and prosocial emotions in the power-to-take. Journal of Economic Psychology 31(6), 908–922. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Feee\u002Fjoepsy\u002Fv31y2010i6p908-922.html.\nSanfey, A. G., Rilling, J. K., Aronson, J. A., Nystrom, L. E., & Cohen, J. D. (2003). The neural basis of economic decision-making in the ultimatum game. Science, 300(5626), 1755–1758.\nThaler, R.H., Shefrin, H.M. (1981). An economic theory of self-control. Journal of Political Economy 89(2), 392–406. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Fucp\u002Fjpolec\u002Fv89y1981i2p392-406.html.\nTrope, Y., & Fishbach, A. (2000). Counteractive self-control in overcoming temptation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 79(4), 493–506.\nWong, W.K. (2008). How much time-inconsistency is there and does it matter? evidence on self-awareness, size, and effects. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 68(3–4), 645–656. Retrieved from http:\u002F\u002Fwww.ideas.repec.org\u002Fa\u002Feee\u002Fjeborg\u002Fv68y2008i3-4p645-656.html.",{"VOID":369},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-014-9419-7","2024-05-31T12:07:42.231+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-014-9419-7",[373,388],{"id":374,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":375,"affiliations":376,"properties":385,"displayName":387,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"86376755-16f7-4e47-8587-b2a74963d946",[266],[377],{"id":378,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":379,"properties":22},"9c22d4da-ef65-4bee-b800-685d7f86ad0f",{"id":378,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":380,"slug":22,"properties":381,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":384,"statistic":22},[],{"title":382},{"VI":383},"CREM - University Rennes 1, Rennes, France",[],{"title":386},{"VI":387},"Aurélie Bonein",{"id":389,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":390,"affiliations":391,"properties":398,"displayName":400,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"49f48dc3-6ec6-4d72-be9c-92df914b83ec",[266],[392],{"id":378,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":393,"properties":22},{"id":378,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":394,"slug":22,"properties":395,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":397,"statistic":22},[],{"title":396},{"VI":383},[],{"title":399,"gsAuthor":401},{"VI":400},"Laurent Denant-Boèmont",{"VOID":402},"[\"sF_fjJ0AAAAJ\"]",{"url":371,"publisher":404,"properties":446},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":405,"slug":10,"properties":406,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":410,"manageAffiliations":415,"indexDatabases":426,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":441,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":407,"title":408,"eissn":409},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[411],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":412,"label":413,"description":414,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[416,421],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":417,"slug":22,"properties":418,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":420,"statistic":22},[],{"title":419},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":422,"slug":22,"properties":423,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":425,"statistic":22},[],{"title":424},{"EN":45},[],[427,434],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":428,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":433,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":429,"label":430,"description":431,"key":58,"publicationTags":432,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":435,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":440,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":436,"label":437,"description":438,"key":74,"publicationTags":439,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":442,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":443,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":444,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":445,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":447,"volume":449},{"VOID":448},"543-568",{"VOID":450},"18",{"total":23,"publishYear":452,"statisticByYear":453},2015,{},"2015-01-24","DONE_ANALYZE_CITATION",[60,81],{"id":458,"createTime":459,"updateTime":460,"relativeEntities":461,"slug":462,"properties":463,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":473,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":474,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":475,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":518,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":566,"publishYear":567,"citationAnalyzeStatus":351,"lastCitationAnalyze":568,"indexDatabases":569,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"806cdd7d-8408-4d36-815a-775ae71170c1","2024-01-10T23:24:43.273+00:00","2026-07-23T12:48:37.696+00:00",[],"The-Secure-Boston-Mechanism-theory-and-experiments",{"abstract":464,"title":466,"gsPaper":468,"references":469,"doi":471},{"EN":465},"This paper introduces a new matching mechanism that is a hybrid of the two most common mechanisms in school choice, the Boston Mechanism (BM) and the Deferred Acceptance algorithm (DA). BM is the most commonly used mechanism in the field, but it is neither strategyproof nor fair. DA is the mechanism that is typically favored by economists, but it is not Pareto efficient. The new mechanism, the Secure Boston Mechanism (sBM), is an intuitive modification of BM that secures any school a student was initially guaranteed but otherwise prioritizes a student at a school based upon how she ranks it. Relative to BM, theoretical results suggest that sBM is an improvement in terms of strategyproofness and fairness. We present experimental evidence using a novel experimental design that confirms that sBM significantly increases truth-telling and fairness. Relative to DA, theoretical results suggest that sBM can be a Pareto improvement in equilibrium but the efficiency comparison of sBM and DA is theoretically ambiguous. We present simulation evidence that suggests that sBM often does Pareto dominate DA when DA is inefficient, while sBM and DA very often overlap when DA is efficient. Overall, our results strongly support the use of sBM over BM and suggest that sBM should be considered as a viable alternative to DA.",{"EN":467},"The Secure Boston Mechanism: theory and experiments",{"VOID":255},{"VOID":470},"Abdulkadiroğlu, A., Che, Y.-K., & Yasuda, Y. (2011). Resolving conflicting preferences in school choice: The “Boston Mechanism” reconsidered. The American Economic Review, 399–410.\nAbdulkadiroğlu, A., & Sönmez, T. (2003). School choice: A mechanism design approach. The American Economic Review, 93(3), 729–747.\nAgarwal, N., & Somaini, P. (2014). Demand analysis using strategic reports: An application to a school choice mechanism. Mimeo.\nBalinski, M., & Sönmez, T. (1999). A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement. Journal of Economic Theory, 84(1), 73–94.\nCalsamiglia, C., Haeringer, G., & Klijn, F. (2010). Constrained school choice: An experimental study. American Economic Review, 860–1874.\nChen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2016). Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: An experimental study. Mimeo.\nChen, Y., Jiang, M., Kesten, O., Robin, S., & Zhu, M. (2018). Matching in the large: An experimental study. Games and Economic Behavior, 110, 295–317.\nChen, Y., & Kesten, O. (2017). Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: A theoretical analysis. Journal of Political Economy, 125(1), 99–139.\nChen, Y., & Sönmez, T. (2006). School choice: An experimental study. Journal of Economic Theory, 127(1), 202–231.\nCookson, P. W. (1995). School choice: The struggle for the soul of American education. New Heaven: Yale University Press.\nDing, T., & Schotter, A. (2014). Matching and chatting: An experimental study of the impact of network communication on school-matching mechanisms. Mimeo.\nDur, U. (2013). The modified Boston Mechanism. Mimeo.\nDur, U., & Morrill, T. (2016). What you don’t know can help you in school assignment. Mimeo.\nDur, U., Hammond, R. G., & Morrill, T. (2018). Identifying the harm of manipulable school-choice mechanisms. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 10(1), 187–213.\nErgin, H., & Sönmez, T. (2006). Games of school choice under the Boston Mechanism. Journal of Public Economics, 90(1), 215–237.\nFeatherstone, C., & Niederle, M. (2014). Improving on strategy-proof school choice mechanisms: An experimental investigation. Mimeo.\nFischbacher, U. (2007). z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.\nGale, D., & Shapley, L. (1962). College admissions and the stability of marriage. American Mathematical Monthly, 69(1), 9–15.\nGlenn, C. L. (1991). Controlled choice in Massachusetts public schools. Public Interest, 103, 88–105.\nGuillen, P., & Hing, A. (2014). Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism. European Economic Review, 70, 178–185.\nHaeringer, G., & Klijn, F. (2009). Constrained school choice. Journal of Economic Theory, 1921–1947.\nHolt, C. A., & Laury, S. K. (2002). Risk aversion and incentive effects. American Economic Review, 92(5), 1644–1655.\nKesten, O. (2010). School choice with consent. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 125(3), 1297–1348.\nKlijn, F., Pais, J., & Vorsatz, M. (2013). Preference intensities and risk aversion in school choice: A laboratory experiment. Experimental Economics, 16(1), 1–22.\nKojima, F., Pathak, P. A., & Roth, A. E. (2013). Matching with couples: Stability and incentives in large markets. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 128(4), 1585–1632.\nKojima, F., & Ünver, U. (2014). The Boston school-choice mechanism: An axiomatic approach. Economic Theory, 53(3), 515–544.\nLien, J. W., Zheng, J., & Zhong, X. (2016). Preference submission timing in school choice matching: Testing fairness and efficiency in the laboratory. Experimental Economics, 19(1), 116–150.\nMennle, T., & Seuken, S. (2015). Trafe-offs in school choice: Comparing deferred acceptance, the naive and the adaptive Boston Mechanism. Mimeo.\nMiralles, A. (2008). School choice: The case for the Boston Method. Mimeo.\nPais, J., & Pintér, Á. (2008). School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms. Games and Economic Behavior, 64(1), 303–328.\nPathak, P. A. (2011). The mechanism design approach to student assignment. Annual Review of Economics, 3(1), 513–536.\nPathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2008). Leveling the playing field: Sincere and sophisticated players in the Boston Mechanism. The American Economic Review, 98(4), 1636–1652.\nPathak, P. A., & Sönmez, T. (2013). School admissions reform in Chicago and England: Comparing mechanisms by their vulnerability to manipulation. The American Economic Review, 103, 80–106.\nRoth, A., & Sotomayor, M. (1990). Two-sided matching: A study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nVaznis, J. (2014). Boston school-assignment letters in the mail. The Boston Globe. https:\u002F\u002Fgoo.gl\u002FNa1Akn. Accessed March 25.\nWCPSS. (2015). Wake county public school system district facts. https:\u002F\u002Fgoo.gl\u002FZJgGb2.",{"VOID":472},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-018-9594-z","2024-06-25T08:06:57.163+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-018-9594-z",[476,491,504],{"id":477,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":478,"affiliations":479,"properties":488,"displayName":490,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"4a83e5d3-6a46-4b23-93be-063549edc3a0",[266],[480],{"id":481,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":482,"properties":22},"b981d307-ab50-4223-8e4e-adc78924cacd",{"id":481,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":483,"slug":22,"properties":484,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":487,"statistic":22},[],{"title":485},{"VI":486},"Department of Economics, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, USA",[],{"title":489},{"VI":490},"Umut Dur",{"id":492,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":493,"affiliations":494,"properties":501,"displayName":503,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"e3572d9b-161d-4018-8f84-9f05b5585795",[266],[495],{"id":481,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":496,"properties":22},{"id":481,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":497,"slug":22,"properties":498,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":500,"statistic":22},[],{"title":499},{"VI":486},[],{"title":502},{"VI":503},"Robert G. Hammond",{"id":505,"sortIndex":506,"researcher":22,"roles":507,"affiliations":508,"properties":515,"displayName":517,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"6944d979-6d1b-44b9-b85b-dd488a2e8eba",2,[266],[509],{"id":481,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":510,"properties":22},{"id":481,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":511,"slug":22,"properties":512,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":514,"statistic":22},[],{"title":513},{"VI":486},[],{"title":516},{"VI":517},"Thayer Morrill",{"url":474,"publisher":519,"properties":561},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":520,"slug":10,"properties":521,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":525,"manageAffiliations":530,"indexDatabases":541,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":556,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":522,"title":523,"eissn":524},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[526],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":527,"label":528,"description":529,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[531,536],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":532,"slug":22,"properties":533,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":535,"statistic":22},[],{"title":534},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":537,"slug":22,"properties":538,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":540,"statistic":22},[],{"title":539},{"EN":45},[],[542,549],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":543,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":548,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":544,"label":545,"description":546,"key":58,"publicationTags":547,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":550,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":555,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":551,"label":552,"description":553,"key":74,"publicationTags":554,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":557,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":558,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":559,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":560,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":562,"volume":564},{"VOID":563},"918-953",{"VOID":565},"22","2018-10-13",2018,"2026-07-23T12:48:37.695+00:00",[60,81],{"id":571,"createTime":572,"updateTime":573,"relativeEntities":574,"slug":575,"properties":576,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":586,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":587,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":588,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":619,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":667,"publishYear":668,"citationAnalyzeStatus":351,"lastCitationAnalyze":669,"indexDatabases":670,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"6f464145-b606-4de4-8164-d902f06271a4","2024-02-09T00:24:01.017+00:00","2026-07-23T07:33:47.212+00:00",[],"Tacit-Coordination-in-a-Decentralized-Market-Entry-Game-with-Fixed-Capacity",{"abstract":577,"title":579,"gsPaper":581,"references":582,"doi":584},{"EN":578},"We focus on a class of market entry games in which a newly emergent market opportunity may be fruitfully exploited by no more than a commonly known, exogenously determined number of firms. Our results show significant effects of the parameters manipulated in the study, namely, the market capacity, entry fee, and method of subject assignment to groups (fixed vs. random). In contrast to previous market entry games with linear payoff functions, we find no evidence of convergence to equilibrium play on the aggregate level. Shifting the focus of the analysis from the aggregate to the individual level, four clusters of subjects are identified. The patterns are: (1) choice of the same action that is independent of the parameters of the game or the outcome of previous presentations of the same game; (2) random choices with probabilities prescribed by the equilibrium solution for risk-neutral players; (3) random choices with probabilities equal to the individual observed overall proportion of entry; and (4) sequential dependencies that violate any model that assumes randomization. Subjects in the fourth and largest category are shown to adjust their choices in accordance with a simple principle of strategic reasoning.",{"EN":580},"Tacit Coordination in a Decentralized Market Entry Game with Fixed Capacity",{"VOID":255},{"VOID":583},"Camerer, C.F. and Ho, T.H. (1999). “Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in Games.” Econometrica. 56, 1–36.\nCamerer, C.F. and Lovallo, D. (1999). “Overconfidence and Excess Entry.” American Economic Review. 89, 306–318.\nClark, K. and Sefton, M. (1999). “Matching Protocols in Experimental Games.” School of Economic Studies Discussion Paper, University of Manchester.\nCooper, R.D. (1999). Coordination in Games: Complementarities and Macroeconomics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nCooper, R.D., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. (1990). “Selection Criteria in Coordination Games: Some Experimental Results.” American Economic Review. 80, 218–233.\nCooper, R.D., DeJong, D., Forsythe, R., and Ross, T. (1994). “Alternative Institutions for Resolving Coordination Problems: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction and Prepaly Communication.” In J.W. Friedman (ed.), Problems of Coordination in Economic Activity. Boston: Kluwer.\nDuffy, J. and Hopkins, E. (2001). “Learning, Information and Sorting in Market Entry Games: Theory and Evidence.” University of Pittsburgh, Department of Economics. Unpublished manuscript.\nErev, I. and Rapoport, A. (1998). “Coordination, “Magic,” and Reinforcement Learning in a Market Entry Game.” Games and Economic Behavior. 23, 145–176.\nFeltovich, N. (2000). “Reinforcement-Based vs. Belief-Based Learning Models in Experimental Asymmetric-Information Games.” Econometrica. 68, 605–641.\nLedyard, J.O. (1995). “Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research.” In J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth (eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 111–194.\nLucas, R.E. Jr. (1986). “Adaptive Behavior and Economic Theory.” In R.M. Hogarth and M.W. Reder (eds.), Rational Choice: The Contrast between Economics and Psychology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 217–242.\nMargolin, B.H. (1988). “Test for Trends in Proportions.” In S. Kotz and N.L. Johnson (eds.), Encyclopedia of Statistical Sciences. New York: Wiley, Vol. 9.\nMcKelvey, R.D. and Palfrey, T.R. (1995). “Quantal Response Equilibria for Normal form Games.” Experimental Economics. 1, 9–42.\nMeyer, D.J., van Huck, J., Battalio, R., and Saving, T. (1992). “History's Role in Coordinating Decentralized Allocation Decisions: Laboratory Evidence on Repeated Binary Allocation Games.” Journal of Political Economy. 100, 292–316.\nOchs, J. (1990). “The Coordination Problem in Decentralized Markets: An Experiment.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 105, 545–559.\nOchs, J. (1995). “Coordination Problems.” In J.H. Kagel and A.E. Roth (eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 195–251.\nOchs, J. (1999). “Coordination in Market Entry Games.” In D.V. Budescu, I. Erev, and R. Zwick (eds.), Games and Human Behavior: Essays in Honor of Amnon Rapoport. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum, pp. 143–172.\nRapoport, A., Seale, D.A., Erev, I., and Sundali, J.A. (1998). “Equilibrium Play in Large Group Market Entry Games.” Management Science. 44, 129–141.\nRoth, A.E. and Erev, I. (1995). “Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term.” Games and Economic Behavior. 8, 164–212.\nSefton, M. (1999). “A Model of Behavior in Coordination Game Experiments.” Experimental Economics. 2, 151–164.\nSchelling, T. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.\nStahl, D.O., Haruvy, E., and Wilson, P. (in press). “Modeling and Testing for Heterogeneity in Observed Strategic Behavior.” Review of Economics and Statistics.\nSundali, J.A., Rapoport, A., and Seale, D.A. (1995). “Coordination in Market Entry Games with Symmetric Players.” Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. 64, 203–218.\nvan Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., and Beil, R.O. (1990). “Tacit Coordination Games, Strategic Uncertainty, and Coordination Failure.” American Economic Review. 80, 234–249.\nvan Huyck, J.B., Battalio, R.C., and Beil, R.O. (1991). “Strategic Uncertainty, Equilibrium Selection, and Coordination Failure in Average Opinion Games.” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106, 885–910.",{"VOID":585},"10.1023\u002FA:1020892405622","2024-08-30T11:16:51.598+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1023\u002FA:1020892405622",[589,604],{"id":590,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":591,"affiliations":592,"properties":601,"displayName":603,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"2653196b-20d9-4e59-9e25-8a3e964ada1d",[266],[593],{"id":594,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":595,"properties":22},"abf58460-f9bc-456a-9059-4e394beb6d0c",{"id":594,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":596,"slug":22,"properties":597,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":600,"statistic":22},[],{"title":598},{"VI":599},"Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China",[],{"title":602},{"VI":603},"Rami Zwick",{"id":605,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":606,"affiliations":607,"properties":616,"displayName":618,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"ca20507e-da36-4a5d-8e69-d20a2b8592c8",[266],[608],{"id":609,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":610,"properties":22},"37ef4501-62bb-475c-a8d5-88703ee7be96",{"id":609,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":611,"slug":22,"properties":612,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":615,"statistic":22},[],{"title":613},{"VI":614},"Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson",[],{"title":617},{"VI":618},"Amnon Rapoport",{"url":587,"publisher":620,"properties":662},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":621,"slug":10,"properties":622,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":626,"manageAffiliations":631,"indexDatabases":642,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":657,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":623,"title":624,"eissn":625},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[627],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":628,"label":629,"description":630,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[632,637],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":633,"slug":22,"properties":634,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":636,"statistic":22},[],{"title":635},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":638,"slug":22,"properties":639,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":641,"statistic":22},[],{"title":640},{"EN":45},[],[643,650],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":644,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":649,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":645,"label":646,"description":647,"key":58,"publicationTags":648,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":651,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":656,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":652,"label":653,"description":654,"key":74,"publicationTags":655,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":658,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":659,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":660,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":661,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":663,"volume":665},{"VOID":664},"253-272",{"VOID":666},"5","2002-12-01",2002,"2026-07-23T07:33:47.211+00:00",[60],{"id":672,"createTime":673,"updateTime":674,"relativeEntities":675,"slug":676,"properties":677,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":689,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":690,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":691,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":735,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":778,"publishYear":779,"citationAnalyzeStatus":351,"lastCitationAnalyze":780,"indexDatabases":781,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"cc333540-0e11-451c-815c-95f02aa8e226","2024-04-08T17:59:21.060+00:00","2026-07-22T17:07:39.203+00:00",[],"Tax-compliance-and-obedience-to-authority-at-home-and-in-the-lab-A-new-experimental-approach",{"abstract":678,"title":680,"gsPaper":682,"keywords":683,"references":685,"doi":687},{"EN":679},"In most experimental studies of tax evasion, participants are instructed that they may report any amount of income from zero up to the amount they actually earned or received. This amounts to an invitation to gamble. In contrast, real-world tax authorities unambiguously demand compliance. We develop two new settings for conducting tax experiments. Both involve an explicit demand for compliance. Thus, we can determine whether knowing that the experimental authority would regard evasion as wrongful disobedience will influence compliance decisions. We demonstrate that simply telling people that they are required to pay a “participation fee” analogous to a tax produces remarkably high compliance rates and less sensitivity to changes in economic variables than in the earlier experimental literature using invitation-to-gamble language. This suggests that many people pay taxes despite the financial attraction of non-compliance because they are strongly inclined towards obeying authority. Furthermore, we show that giving participants a week to make their reporting decisions at home without an authority figure physically present overcomes the inclination to obey for some people, significantly lowering compliance rates. However, the majority still complies, even after the audit rate falls from 25% to 1%, which would make non-compliance extremely attractive if it were viewed only as a simple matter of risk and expected return.",{"EN":681},"Tax compliance and obedience to authority at home and in the lab: A new experimental approach",{"VOID":255},{"EN":684},"",{"VOID":686},"Akerlof, G. (1991). “Procrastination and Obedience.” American Economic Review. 91, 1–19.\nAllingham, M. G., & Sandmo, A. (1972). “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.” Journal of Public Economics. 1, 323–338.\nAlm, J., Cronshaw, M., & McKee, M. (1993a). “Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules.” Kyklos. 46, 27–45.\nAlm, J., Jackson, B., & McKee, M. (1992a). “Institutional Uncertainty and Taxpayer Compliance.” American Economic Review. 82, 1018–1026.\nAlm, J., Jackson, B., & McKee, M. (1992b). “Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data.” National Tax Journal. 45, 107–114.\nAlm, J., Jackson, B., & McKee, M. (1993b). “Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision Institutions and Tax Compliance.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. 22, 285–303.\nAlm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D. (1992c). “Why Do People Pay Taxes?” Journal of Public Economics. 48, 21–38.\nAlm, J., McKee, M., & Beck, W. (1990). “Amazing Grace: Tax Amnesties and Compliance.” National Tax Journal. 43, 23–37.\nAlm, J., Sanchez, I., & de Juan, A. (1995). “Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance.” Kyklos. 48, 3–18.\nAlm, J., McClelland, G. H., & Schulze, W. D. (1999). “Changing the Social Norm of Tax Compliance by Voting.” Kyklos. 52, 141–171.\nBeron, K. J., Tauchen, H. V., & Witte, A. D. (1992). “The Effect of Audits and Socioeconomic Variables on Compliance.” In: Slemrod, J. (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 67–89.\nBoylan, S. J., & Sprinkle, G. B. (2001). “Experimental Evidence on the Relation between Tax Rates and Compliance: The Effect of Earned Versus Endowed Income.” Journal of the American Taxation Association. 23, 75–90.\nCialdini, R. B. (2001). Influence: Science and Practice. Fourth Edition. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.\nElffers, H. (2000). “But Taxpayers Do Cooperate!” In: Van Vugt, M., Snyder, M., Tyler, T. R., & Biel, A. (eds.), Cooperation in Modern Society: Promoting the Welfare of Communities, States and Organizations. London: Routledge, pp. 184–94.\nFeld, L. P., & Tyran, J. R. (2002). “Tax Evasion and Voting: An Experimental Analysis.” Kyklos. 55, 197–221.\nGraetz, M. J., & Wilde, L. (1985). “The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy.” National Tax Journal. 38, 355–363.\nHoffman, E., & Spitzer, M. L. (1985). “Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice.” Journal of Legal Studies. 14, 259–297.\nKilham, W., & Mann, L. (1974). “Level of Destructive Obedience as a Function of Transmitter and Executant Roles in the Milgram Obedience Paradigm.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 29, 696–702.\nKinsey, K. A. (1992). “Deterrence and Alienation Effects of IRS Enforcement: An Analysis of Survey Data.” In: Slemrod, J. (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 259–285.\nLong, S., & Swingen, J. (1991) “The Conduct of Tax-Evasion Experiments: Validation, Analytical Methods, and Experimental Realism.” In: Webley, P., Robben, H., Elffers, H., & Hessing, D. (eds.), Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 128–38.\nMeeus, W.H.J., & Raaijmakers, Q.A.W. (1995). “Obedience in Modern Society: The Utrecht Studies.” Journal of Social Issues. 51, 155–175.\nMilgram, S. (1963). “Behavioral Study of Obedience.” Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology. 67, 371–378.\nMilgram, S. (1974). Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View. New York: Harper and Row.\nMoser, D. V., Evans, J. H. III, & Kim, C. K. (1995). “The Effects of Horizontal and Exchange Inequity on Tax Reporting Decisions.” The Accounting Review. 70, 619–634.\nScholz, J. T., & Pinney, N. (1995). “Duty, Fear, and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior.” American Journal of Political Science. 39, 490–512.\nSkinner, J., & Slemrod, J. (1985). “An Economic Perspective on Tax Evasion.” National Tax Journal. 38, 345–353.\nSmith, K. W. (1992). “Reciprocity and Fairness: Positive Incentives for Tax Compliance. ” In: Slemrod, J. (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 223–250.\nSpicer, M., & L. Becker. (1980). “Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach. ” National Tax Journal. 33, 171–175.\nSpicer, M. W., & Hero, R. E. (1985). “Tax Evasion and Heuristics.” Journal of Public Economics. 26, 263–267.\nSteenbergen, M. R., McGraw, K. M., & Scholz, J. T. (1992). “Taxpayer Adaptation to the 1986 Tax Reform Act: Do New Tax Laws Affect the Way Taxpayers Think About Taxes?” In: Slemrod, J. (ed.), Why People Pay Taxes: Tax Compliance and Enforcement. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, pp. 9–37.\nTorgler, B. (2002). “Speaking to Theorists and Searching for Facts: Tax Morale and Tax Compliance in Experiments.” Journal of Economic Surveys. 16, 657–683.\nTrivedi, V. U., & Chung, J. (2006). “The Impact of Compensation Level and Context on Income Reporting Behavior in the Laboratory.” Behavioral Research in Accounting (forthcoming).\nWartick, M. L., Madeo, S. A., & Vines, C. C. (1999). “Reward Dominance in Tax Reporting Experiments: The Role of Context.” The Journal of the American Taxation Association. 21, 20–31.\nWebley, P., & Halstead, S. (1986). “Tax Evasion on the Micro: Significant Simulations or Expedient Experiments?” Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics. 1, 87–100.\nYitzhaki, S. (1974). “A Note on Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis.” Journal of Public Economics. 3, 201–202.",{"VOID":688},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-7053-8","2024-06-25T16:26:03.222+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-7053-8",[692,707,722],{"id":693,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":694,"affiliations":695,"properties":704,"displayName":706,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"f1b48b87-d8a5-4d34-881b-35d0cc8919b2",[266],[696],{"id":697,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":698,"properties":22},"8abef25e-43d3-49e6-b9ba-ff6f880670da",{"id":697,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":699,"slug":22,"properties":700,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":703,"statistic":22},[],{"title":701},{"EN":702},"Department of Economics, University of Guelph, Guelph, Canada.",[],{"title":705},{"VI":706},"C. Bram Cadsby",{"id":708,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":709,"affiliations":710,"properties":719,"displayName":721,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"d1a5a56a-4584-406e-9683-98deb0317ff2",[266],[711],{"id":712,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":713,"properties":22},"97ca4c96-91bb-49ac-a66b-017d34c8b418",{"id":712,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":714,"slug":22,"properties":715,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":718,"statistic":22},[],{"title":716},{"VI":717},"Schulich School of Business, York University, Toronto, Canada",[],{"title":720},{"VI":721},"Elizabeth Maynes",{"id":723,"sortIndex":506,"researcher":22,"roles":724,"affiliations":725,"properties":732,"displayName":734,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"b4c32b9f-9baf-46b1-8684-899ad27f2700",[266],[726],{"id":712,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":727,"properties":22},{"id":712,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":728,"slug":22,"properties":729,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":731,"statistic":22},[],{"title":730},{"VI":717},[],{"title":733},{"VI":734},"Viswanath Umashanker Trivedi",{"url":22,"publisher":736,"properties":22},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":737,"slug":10,"properties":738,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":742,"manageAffiliations":747,"indexDatabases":758,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":773,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":739,"title":740,"eissn":741},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[743],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":744,"label":745,"description":746,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[748,753],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":749,"slug":22,"properties":750,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":752,"statistic":22},[],{"title":751},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":754,"slug":22,"properties":755,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":757,"statistic":22},[],{"title":756},{"EN":45},[],[759,766],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":760,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":765,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":761,"label":762,"description":763,"key":58,"publicationTags":764,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":767,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":772,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":768,"label":769,"description":770,"key":74,"publicationTags":771,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":774,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":775,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":776,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":777,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},"2006-12-01",2006,"2026-07-22T17:07:39.202+00:00",[60,81],{"id":783,"createTime":784,"updateTime":785,"relativeEntities":786,"slug":787,"properties":788,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":799,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":800,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":801,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":883,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":931,"publishDate":933,"publishYear":452,"citationAnalyzeStatus":455,"lastCitationAnalyze":934,"indexDatabases":935,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"19301d8b-9e50-4abc-80c6-0167893e1025","2023-12-14T02:06:39.219+00:00","2026-07-22T09:03:25.928+00:00",[],"Keeping-others-in-our-mind-or-in-our-heart-Distribution-games-under-cognitive-load",{"abstract":789,"title":791,"gsPaper":793,"references":795,"doi":797},{"EN":790},"It has recently been argued that giving is spontaneous while greed is calculated (Rand et al., in Nature 489:427–430, 2012). If greed is calculated we would expect that cognitive load, which is assumed to reduce the influence of cognitive processes, should affect greed. In this paper we study both charitable giving and the behavior of dictators under high and low cognitive load to test if greed is affected by the load. This is tested in three different dictator game experiments. In the dictator games we use both a give frame, where the dictators are given an amount that they may share with a partner, and a take frame, where dictators may take from an amount initially allocated to the partner. The results from all three experiments show that the behavioral effect in terms of allocated money of the induced load is small if at all existent. At the same time, follow-up questions indicate that the subjects’ decisions are more impulsive and less driven by their thoughts under cognitive load.",{"EN":792},"Keeping others in our mind or in our heart? Distribution games under cognitive load",{"VOID":794},"[\"3837591232497274857\"]",{"VOID":796},"Andreoni, J. (1995). Warm glow versus cold prickle: The effect of positive and negative framing on cooperation in experiments. Quartely Journal of Economics, 110(1), 1–21.\nBardsley, N. (2008). Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact? Experimental Economics, 11(2), 122–133.\nBenjamin, D. J., Brown, S. A., & Shapiro, J. M. (2013). Who is ‘behavioral’? Cognitive ability and anomalous preferences. Journal of the European Economic Association, 11(6), 1231–1255.\nBosman, R., & van Winden, F. (2002). Emotional hazard in a power-to-take experiment. The Economic Journal, 112(476), 147–169. doi:10.1111\u002F1468-0297.0j677.\nCappelletti, D., Güth, W., & Ploner, M. (2011). Being of two minds: ultimatum offers under cognitive constraints. Journal of Economic Psychology, In Press, Accepted Manuscript, doi:10.1016\u002Fj.joep.2011.08.001.\nCornelissen, G., Dewitte, S., & Warlop, L. (2011). Are social value orientations expressed automatically? decision making in the dictator game. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 37(8), 1080–1090. doi:10.1177\u002F0146167211405996.\nCubitt, R. P., Drouvelis, M., & Gächter, S. (2011). Framing and free riding: emotional responses and punishment in social dilemma games. Experimental Economics, 14(2), 254–272.\nDreber, A., Ellingsen, T., Johannesson, M., & Rand, D. (2013). Do people care about social context? Framing effects in dictator games. Experimental Economics, 16(3), 349–371. doi:10.1007\u002Fs10683-012-9341-9.\nEckel, C. C., & Grossman, P. (1996). Altruism in anonymous dictator games. Games and Economic Behavior, 16, 181–191.\nEngel, C. (2011). Dictator games: A meta study. Experimental Economics, 14(4), 583–610. doi:10.1007\u002Fs10683-011-9283-7.\nGilbert, D. T., Giesler, B. R., & Morris, K. A. (1995). When comparisons arise. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(2), 227–236.\nHaidt, J. (2001). The emotional dog and its rational tail: A social intuitionist approach to moral judgement. Psychological Review, 108(4), 814–834.\nHaidt, J. (2012). The righteous mind: Why good people are divided by politics and religion 2012. London: Allen Lane.\nKahneman, D., & Beatty, J. (1966). Pupil diameter and load on memory. Science, 154(3756), 1583–1585.\nKohlberg, L. (1969). Stage and sequence: The cognitive-developmental approach to socialization. New York: Rand McNally.\nMoore, D. A., & Loewenstein, G. (2004). Self-interest, automaticity, and the psychology of conflict of interest. Social Justice Research, 17(2), 189–202.\nPiovesan, M., & Wengström, E. (2009). Fast or fair? A study of response times. Economics Letters, 105(2), 193–196.\nRand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012). Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature, 489(7416), 427–430.\nRoch, S., Lane, J. A. S., Samuelson, C. D., Allison, S. T., & Dent, J. L. (2000). Cognitive load and the equality heuristic: A two-stage model of resouce overconsumption in small groups. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 83(2), 185–212.\nSchulz, J. F., Fischbacher, U., Thöni, C., & Utikal, V. (2012). Affect and fairness: dictator games under cognitive load. Journal of Economic Psychology, 41, 77–87.\nShiv, B., & Fedorikhin, A. (1999). Heart and mind in conflict: The interplay of affect and cognition in consumer decision making. Journal of Consumer Research, 26, 278–292.\nShiv, B., & Nowlis, Stephen M. (2004). The effect of distractions while tasting a food sample: The interplay of informational and affective components in subsequent choice. Journal of Consumer Research, 31(3), 599–608. doi:10.1086\u002F425095.\nSonnemans, J., Schram, A., & Offerman, T. (1998). Public good provision and public bad prevention: The effect of framing. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 34(1), 143–161.\nSwann, W. B., Hixon, J. G., Stein-Seroussi, A., & Gilbert, D. T. (1990). The fleeting gleam of praise: Cognitive processes underlying behavioral reaction to self-relevant feedback. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59(1), 17–26.\nTinghög, G., Andersson, D., Bonn, C., Böttiger, H., Josephson, C., Lundgren, G., et al. (2013). Intuition and cooperation reconsidered. Nature, 498(7452), E1–E2.\nTrope, Y., & Alfieri, T. (1997). Effortfulness and flexibility of dispositional judgment processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73(4), 662–674.\nTversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131.\nvan Winden, F. (2007). Affect and fairness in economics. Social Justice Research, 20(1), 35–52. doi:10.1007\u002Fs11211-007-0029-9.\nWatson, D., & Clark, L. A. (1994). The PANAS-X: Manual for the positive and negative affect schedule-expanded form (Psychology Publications). Iowa: Iowa Research Online: http:\u002F\u002Fir.uiowa.edu\u002Fpsychology_pubs\u002F11\u002F.",{"VOID":798},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-015-9454-z","2024-05-12T04:24:07.904+00:00","http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-015-9454-z",[802,819,836,851,867],{"id":803,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":804,"affiliations":805,"properties":814,"displayName":816,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"4a9d8e6e-7326-421f-bb11-3f6a22b1c2f2",[266],[806],{"id":807,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":808,"properties":22},"49afbdc7-d00a-4090-b2da-3a73cd774605",{"id":807,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":809,"slug":22,"properties":810,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":813,"statistic":22},[],{"title":811},{"VI":812},"Ragnar Frisch Centre for Economic Research, Oslo, Norway",[],{"title":815,"gsAuthor":817},{"VI":816},"Karen Evelyn Hauge",{"VOID":818},"[\"ALtz1qkAAAAJ\"]",{"id":820,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":821,"affiliations":822,"properties":831,"displayName":833,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"b1b6209f-df50-4d1e-a895-c271061a9b11",[266],[823],{"id":824,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":825,"properties":22},"3bf830de-c811-48d0-aeee-8d530c51afb8",{"id":824,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":826,"slug":22,"properties":827,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":830,"statistic":22},[],{"title":828},{"VI":829},"Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway",[],{"title":832,"gsAuthor":834},{"VI":833},"Kjell Arne Brekke",{"VOID":835},"[\"WCuWZ8kAAAAJ\"]",{"id":837,"sortIndex":506,"researcher":22,"roles":838,"affiliations":839,"properties":848,"displayName":850,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"875e23f1-a9db-4f84-a2fe-6f7b396ddccc",[266],[840],{"id":841,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":842,"properties":22},"0979512b-1d10-49d8-960e-5d004cbcb1e2",{"id":841,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":843,"slug":22,"properties":844,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":847,"statistic":22},[],{"title":845},{"VI":846},"Department of Psychology, University of Gothenburg, Göteborg, Sweden",[],{"title":849},{"VI":850},"Lars-Olof Johansson",{"id":852,"sortIndex":853,"researcher":22,"roles":854,"affiliations":855,"properties":864,"displayName":866,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"aaf6c540-b08a-4fbb-8d34-48f67e9bf8e5",3,[266],[856],{"id":857,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":858,"properties":22},"326676f7-bc47-4218-85eb-07ce57d82e0d",{"id":857,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":859,"slug":22,"properties":860,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":863,"statistic":22},[],{"title":861},{"VI":862},"Departement of Economics, School of Business, Economics and Law, University of Gothenburg, Göteborg, Sweden",[],{"title":865},{"VI":866},"Olof Johansson-Stenman",{"id":868,"sortIndex":869,"researcher":22,"roles":870,"affiliations":871,"properties":880,"displayName":882,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"99bed36d-f882-4fac-8dec-9f66c798afa9",4,[266],[872],{"id":873,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":874,"properties":22},"234d9555-e44b-46a6-aa65-f4c08309c360",{"id":873,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":875,"slug":22,"properties":876,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":879,"statistic":22},[],{"title":877},{"VI":878},"Glaxo Smith Kline, Uxbridge, UK",[],{"title":881},{"VI":882},"Henrik Svedsäter",{"url":800,"publisher":884,"properties":926},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":885,"slug":10,"properties":886,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":890,"manageAffiliations":895,"indexDatabases":906,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":921,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":887,"title":888,"eissn":889},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[891],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":892,"label":893,"description":894,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[896,901],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":897,"slug":22,"properties":898,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":900,"statistic":22},[],{"title":899},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":902,"slug":22,"properties":903,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":905,"statistic":22},[],{"title":904},{"EN":45},[],[907,914],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":908,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":913,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":909,"label":910,"description":911,"key":58,"publicationTags":912,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":915,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":920,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":916,"label":917,"description":918,"key":74,"publicationTags":919,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":922,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":923,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":924,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":925,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":927,"volume":929},{"VOID":928},"562-576",{"VOID":930},"19",{"total":23,"publishYear":452,"statisticByYear":932},{},"2015-06-25","2026-07-22T09:03:25.927+00:00",[60,81],{"id":937,"createTime":938,"updateTime":939,"relativeEntities":940,"slug":941,"properties":942,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":938,"verifyNote":129,"languages":953,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":954,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":955,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":1015,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":1065,"publishDate":1068,"publishYear":1066,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":1069,"indexDatabases":1070,"openAccess":22,"references":1071,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"fe782a9c-6f60-4ff6-807f-8b900fae8ee1","2024-09-20T02:51:42.736+00:00","2026-07-21T09:51:29.696+00:00",[],"The-online-laboratory-conducting-experiments-in-a-real-labor-market",{"openalex":943,"mag":945,"title":947,"gsPaper":949,"doi":951},{"VOID":944},"W3124878131",{"VOID":946},"3124878131",{"EN":948},"The online laboratory: conducting experiments in a real labor market",{"VOID":950},"[\"16067992968342404186\"]",{"VOID":952},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-011-9273-9",[131],"http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-011-9273-9",[956,977,996],{"id":957,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":958,"affiliations":959,"properties":968,"displayName":972,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"e2a86692-4db6-41d1-a9c9-fe60853e8f70",[],[960],{"id":961,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":962,"properties":22},"0b0c0a60-ed48-446b-af3e-28aa724bebdc",{"id":961,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":963,"slug":22,"properties":964,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":967,"statistic":22},[],{"title":965},{"VI":966},"Harvard University, Cambridge, USA",[],{"orcid":969,"title":971,"gsAuthor":973,"openalex":975},{"VOID":970},"https:\u002F\u002Forcid.org\u002F0000-0001-5426-0156",{"EN":972},"John J. Horton",{"VOID":974},"[\"L_O2kH0AAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":976},"A5077125314",{"id":978,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":979,"affiliations":980,"properties":987,"displayName":991,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"f69da90d-d4de-4e03-a883-a1df09946199",[],[981],{"id":961,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":982,"properties":22},{"id":961,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":983,"slug":22,"properties":984,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":986,"statistic":22},[],{"title":985},{"VI":966},[],{"orcid":988,"title":990,"gsAuthor":992,"openalex":994},{"VOID":989},"https:\u002F\u002Forcid.org\u002F0000-0002-2821-468X",{"EN":991},"David G. Rand",{"VOID":993},"[\"C0ANojIAAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":995},"A5101904505",{"id":997,"sortIndex":506,"researcher":22,"roles":998,"affiliations":999,"properties":1006,"displayName":1010,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"fa1d058c-3dda-4532-9d47-9c74d07f0938",[],[1000],{"id":961,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1001,"properties":22},{"id":961,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1002,"slug":22,"properties":1003,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1005,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1004},{"VI":966},[],{"orcid":1007,"title":1009,"gsAuthor":1011,"openalex":1013},{"VOID":1008},"https:\u002F\u002Forcid.org\u002F0000-0002-4222-9546",{"EN":1010},"Richard Zeckhauser",{"VOID":1012},"[\"WAXNS0QAAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":1014},"A5023887452",{"url":22,"publisher":1016,"properties":1058},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1017,"slug":10,"properties":1018,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1022,"manageAffiliations":1027,"indexDatabases":1038,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1053,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1019,"title":1020,"eissn":1021},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1023],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1024,"label":1025,"description":1026,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1028,1033],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1029,"slug":22,"properties":1030,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1032,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1031},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1034,"slug":22,"properties":1035,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1037,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1036},{"EN":45},[],[1039,1046],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1040,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1045,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1041,"label":1042,"description":1043,"key":58,"publicationTags":1044,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1047,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":1052,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1048,"label":1049,"description":1050,"key":74,"publicationTags":1051,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1054,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1055,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1056,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1057,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"issue":1059,"pages":1061,"volume":1063},{"VOID":1060},"3",{"VOID":1062},"399-425",{"VOID":1064},"14",{"total":23,"publishYear":1066,"statisticByYear":1067},2011,{},"2011-09-01","2026-07-21T09:51:29.695+00:00",[60,81],[1072,1076,1080,1084,1088,1092,1096,1100,1103,1106,1109,1113,1116,1120,1124,1128,1132,1135,1138,1142,1146,1150,1154,1158,1161,1164,1168,1172,1176,1180,1183,1187,1191,1194,1197,1201,1205,1209,1213,1216,1220,1224,1227,1231,1235],{"id":22,"text":1073,"url":22,"identifiers":1074},"Andreoni, J. (1990). Impure altruism and donations to public goods: a theory of warm-glow giving. The Economic Journal, 464–477.",{"doi":1075},"10.2307\u002F2234133",{"id":22,"text":1077,"url":22,"identifiers":1078},"Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981). The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489), 1390.",{"doi":1079},"10.1126\u002Fscience.7466396",{"id":22,"text":1081,"url":22,"identifiers":1082},"Bainbridge, W. S. (2007). The scientific research potential of virtual worlds. Science, 317(5837), 472.",{"doi":1083},"10.1126\u002Fscience.1146930",{"id":22,"text":1085,"url":22,"identifiers":1086},"Benjamin, D. J., Choi, J. J., & Strickland, A. (2010a). Social identity and preferences. American Economic Review (forthcoming).",{"doi":1087},"10.1257\u002Faer.100.4.1913",{"id":22,"text":1089,"url":22,"identifiers":1090},"Benjamin, D. J., Choi, J. J., Strickland, A., & Fisher, G. (2010b) Religious identity and economic behavior. Cornell University, Mimeo.",{"doi":1091},"10.3386\u002Fw15925",{"id":22,"text":1093,"url":22,"identifiers":1094},"Bohnet, I., Greig, F., Herrmann, B., & Zeckhauser, R. (2008). Betrayal aversion: evidence from Brazil, China, Oman, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. American Economic Review, 98(1), 294–310.",{"doi":1095},"10.1257\u002Faer.98.1.294",{"id":22,"text":1097,"url":22,"identifiers":1098},"Brandts, J., & Charness, G. (2000). Hot vs. cold: sequential responses and preference stability in experimental games. Experimental Economics, 2(3), 227–238.",{"doi":1099},"10.1023\u002FA:1009962612354",{"id":22,"text":1101,"url":22,"identifiers":1102},"Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral game theory: experiments in strategic interaction. Princeton: Princeton University Press.",{},{"id":22,"text":1104,"url":22,"identifiers":1105},"Chandler, D., & Kapelner, A. (2010). Breaking monotony with meaning: motivation in crowdsourcing markets. University of Chicago, Mimeo.",{},{"id":22,"text":1107,"url":22,"identifiers":1108},"Chen, D., & Horton, J. (2010). The wages of pay cuts: evidence from a field experiment. Harvard University, Mimeo.",{},{"id":22,"text":1110,"url":22,"identifiers":1111},"Chilton, L. B., Sims, C. T., Goldman, M., Little, G., & Miller, R. C. (2009). Seaweed: a web application for designing economic games. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD workshop on human computation (pp. 34–35). New York: ACM Press.",{"doi":1112},"10.1145\u002F1600150.1600162",{"id":22,"text":1114,"url":22,"identifiers":1115},"Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.",{},{"id":22,"text":1117,"url":22,"identifiers":1118},"Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2006). Internet cautions: experimental games with Internet partners. Experimental Economics, 9(1), 53–66.",{"doi":1119},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-4307-4",{"id":22,"text":1121,"url":22,"identifiers":1122},"Falk, A., & Heckman, J. J. (2009). Lab experiments are a major source of knowledge in the social sciences. Science, 326(5952), 535.",{"doi":1123},"10.1126\u002Fscience.1168244",{"id":22,"text":1125,"url":22,"identifiers":1126},"Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M. (1999). A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114(3), 817–868.",{"doi":1127},"10.1162\u002F003355399556151",{"id":22,"text":1129,"url":22,"identifiers":1130},"Fehr, E., Schmidt, K. M., & Gächter, S. (2000). Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review, 90(4), 980–994.",{"doi":1131},"10.1257\u002Faer.90.4.980",{"id":22,"text":1133,"url":22,"identifiers":1134},"Fischbacher, U. (2007). z- tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics, 10(2), 171–178.",{"doi":126},{"id":22,"text":1136,"url":22,"identifiers":1137},"Frei, B. (2009). Paid crowdsourcing: current state & progress toward mainstream business use. Produced by Smartsheet.com.",{},{"id":22,"text":1139,"url":22,"identifiers":1140},"Gneezy, U., Leonard, K. L., & List, J. A. (2009). Gender differences in competition: evidence from a matrilineal and a patriarchal society. Econometrica, 77(5), 1637–1664.",{"doi":1141},"10.3982\u002FECTA6690",{"id":22,"text":1143,"url":22,"identifiers":1144},"Harrison, G. W., & List, J. A. (2004). Field experiments. Journal of Economic Literature, 42(4), 1009–1055.",{"doi":1145},"10.1257\u002F0022051043004577",{"id":22,"text":1147,"url":22,"identifiers":1148},"Herrmann, B., & Thöni, C. (2009). Measuring conditional cooperation: a replication study in Russia. Experimental Economics, 12(1), 87–92.",{"doi":1149},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-008-9197-1",{"id":22,"text":1151,"url":22,"identifiers":1152},"Horton, J. (2010). Online labor markets. In Workshop on Internet and network economics (pp. 515–522).",{"doi":1153},"10.1007\u002F978-3-642-17572-5_45",{"id":22,"text":1155,"url":22,"identifiers":1156},"Horton, J. (2011). The condition of the Turking class: are online employers fair and honest? Economic Letters (forthcoming).",{"doi":1157},"10.1016\u002Fj.econlet.2010.12.007",{"id":22,"text":1159,"url":22,"identifiers":1160},"Horton, J. & Chilton, L. (2010). The labor economics of paid crowdsourcing. In Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on electronic commerce.",{},{"id":22,"text":1162,"url":22,"identifiers":1163},"Ipeirotis, P. (2010). Demographics of Mechanical Turk. New York University Working Paper.",{},{"id":22,"text":1165,"url":22,"identifiers":1166},"Kagel, J. H., Roth, A. E., & Hey, J. D. (1995). The handbook of experimental economics. Princeton: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":1167},"10.1515\u002F9780691213255",{"id":22,"text":1169,"url":22,"identifiers":1170},"Kittur, A., Chi, E. H., & Suh, B. (2008). Crowdsourcing user studies with Mechanical Turk.",{"doi":1171},"10.1145\u002F1357054.1357127",{"id":22,"text":1173,"url":22,"identifiers":1174},"Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2005). The decision maker matters: individual versus group behaviour in experimental beauty-contest games*. The Economic Journal, 115(500), 200–223.",{"doi":1175},"10.1111\u002Fj.1468-0297.2004.00966.x",{"id":22,"text":1177,"url":22,"identifiers":1178},"Levitt, S. D., & List, J. A. (2009). Field experiments in economics: the past, the present, and the future. European Economic Review, 53(1), 1–18.",{"doi":1179},"10.1016\u002Fj.euroecorev.2008.12.001",{"id":22,"text":1181,"url":22,"identifiers":1182},"Little, G., Chilton, L. B., Goldman, M., & Miller, R. C. (2009). TurKit: tools for iterative tasks on Mechanical Turk. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD workshop on human computation. New York: ACM Press.",{},{"id":22,"text":1184,"url":22,"identifiers":1185},"Lucking-Reiley, D. (2000). Auctions on the Internet: what’s being auctioned, and how? The Journal of Industrial Economics, 48(3), 227–252.",{"doi":1186},"10.1111\u002F1467-6451.00122",{"id":22,"text":1188,"url":22,"identifiers":1189},"Mason, W., & Watts, D. J. (2009). Financial incentives and the performance of crowds. In Proceedings of the ACM SIGKDD workshop on human computation (pp. 77–85). New York: ACM Press.",{"doi":1190},"10.1145\u002F1600150.1600175",{"id":22,"text":1192,"url":22,"identifiers":1193},"Mason, W., Watts, D. J., & Suri, S. (2010). Conducting behavioral research on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk. SSRN eLibrary.",{},{"id":22,"text":1195,"url":22,"identifiers":1196},"Pallais, A. (2010). Inefficient hiring in entry-level labor markets.",{},{"id":22,"text":1198,"url":22,"identifiers":1199},"Paolacci, G., Chandler, J., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2010). Running experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk. Judgment and Decision Making, 5.",{"doi":1200},"10.1017\u002FS1930297500002205",{"id":22,"text":1202,"url":22,"identifiers":1203},"Resnick, P., Kuwabara, K., Zeckhauser, R., & Friedman, E. (2000). Reputation systems. Communications of the ACM, 43(12), 45–48.",{"doi":1204},"10.1145\u002F355112.355122",{"id":22,"text":1206,"url":22,"identifiers":1207},"Resnick, P., Zeckhauser, R., Swanson, J., & Lockwood, K. (2006). The value of reputation on eBay: a controlled experiment. Experimental Economics, 9(2), 79–101.",{"doi":1208},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-4309-2",{"id":22,"text":1210,"url":22,"identifiers":1211},"Rubin, D. B. (1974). Estimating causal effects of treatments in randomized and nonrandomized studies. Journal of Educational Psychology, 66(5), 688–701.",{"doi":1212},"10.1037\u002Fh0037350",{"id":22,"text":1214,"url":22,"identifiers":1215},"Selten, R. (1967). Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschrankt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments. Beitrage zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, 1, 136–168.",{},{"id":22,"text":1217,"url":22,"identifiers":1218},"Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2007). God is watching you. Psychological Science, 18(9), 803–809.",{"doi":1219},"10.1111\u002Fj.1467-9280.2007.01983.x",{"id":22,"text":1221,"url":22,"identifiers":1222},"Sheng, V. S., Provost, F., & Ipeirotis, P. G. (2008). Get another label? Improving data quality and data mining using multiple, noisy labelers. In Proceeding of the 14th ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining (pp. 614–622). New York: ACM Press.",{"doi":1223},"10.1145\u002F1401890.1401965",{"id":22,"text":1225,"url":22,"identifiers":1226},"Sorokin, A., & Forsyth, D. (2008). Utility data annotation with Amazon Mechanical Turk. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Mimeo, 51, 61820.",{},{"id":22,"text":1228,"url":22,"identifiers":1229},"Suri, S., & Watts, D. (2011). A study of cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments. PLoS ONE (forthcoming).",{"doi":1230},"10.1371\u002Fjournal.pone.0016836",{"id":22,"text":1232,"url":22,"identifiers":1233},"Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1981). The framing of decisions and the psychology of choice. Science, 211(4481), 453.",{"doi":1234},"10.1126\u002Fscience.7455683",{"id":22,"text":1236,"url":22,"identifiers":1237},"von Ahn, L., Blum, M., Hopper, N. J., & Langford, J. (2003). CAPTCHA: using hard AI problems for security. In Lecture notes in computer science (pp. 294–311). Berlin: Springer.",{},{"id":1239,"createTime":1240,"updateTime":1241,"relativeEntities":1242,"slug":1243,"properties":1244,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":1253,"verifyNote":129,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":1254,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":1255,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":1286,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":1334,"publishDate":1336,"publishYear":1066,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":1337,"indexDatabases":1338,"openAccess":22,"references":1339,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"9450911c-715f-4020-802f-8895d1f4de04","2023-12-05T07:28:18.968+00:00","2026-04-26T16:12:34.852+00:00",[],"Does-competition-foster-trust-The-role-of-tournament-incentives",{"abstract":1245,"title":1247,"gsPaper":1249,"doi":1251},{"EN":1246},"Members of organizations are often called upon to trust others and to reciprocate trust while at the same time competing for bonuses or promotions. We suggest that competition affects trust not only within dyads including direct competitors, but also between individuals who do not compete against each other. We test this idea in a trust game where trustors and trustees are rewarded based either on their absolute performance or on how well they do relative to players from other dyads. In Experiment 1, we show that competition among trustors significantly increases trust. Competition among trustees decreases trustworthiness, but trustors do not anticipate this effect. In Experiment 2, we additionally show that the increase in trust under competition is caused by a combination of increased risk taking and lower sensitivity to non-financial concerns specific to trust interactions. Our results suggest that tournament incentives might have a “blinding effect” on considerations such as betrayal and inequality aversion.",{"EN":1248},"Does competition foster trust? The role of tournament incentives",{"VOID":1250},"[\"15662465042202666380\"]",{"VOID":1252},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-011-9297-1","2024-05-03T00:53:44.956+00:00","http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-011-9297-1",[1256,1271],{"id":1257,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":1258,"affiliations":1259,"properties":1268,"displayName":1270,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"0d06f279-b4bd-4040-98c4-d49a35e15449",[266],[1260],{"id":1261,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1262,"properties":22},"bf81b89b-edb4-4093-814c-2ba106f3335e",{"id":1261,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1263,"slug":22,"properties":1264,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1267,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1265},{"VI":1266},"INSEAD, Fontainebleau Cedex, France",[],{"title":1269},{"VI":1270},"Steffen Keck",{"id":1272,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":1273,"affiliations":1274,"properties":1281,"displayName":1283,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"33d7793a-f437-48ef-b94d-fa40cfc069e3",[266],[1275],{"id":1261,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1276,"properties":22},{"id":1261,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1277,"slug":22,"properties":1278,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1280,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1279},{"VI":1266},[],{"title":1282,"gsAuthor":1284},{"VI":1283},"Natalia Karelaia",{"VOID":1285},"[\"fMaFBlEAAAAJ\"]",{"url":1254,"publisher":1287,"properties":1329},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1288,"slug":10,"properties":1289,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1293,"manageAffiliations":1298,"indexDatabases":1309,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1324,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1290,"title":1291,"eissn":1292},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1294],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1295,"label":1296,"description":1297,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1299,1304],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1300,"slug":22,"properties":1301,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1303,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1302},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1305,"slug":22,"properties":1306,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1308,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1307},{"EN":45},[],[1310,1317],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1311,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1316,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1312,"label":1313,"description":1314,"key":58,"publicationTags":1315,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1318,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":1323,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1319,"label":1320,"description":1321,"key":74,"publicationTags":1322,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1325,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1326,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1327,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1328,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"pages":1330,"volume":1332},{"VOID":1331},"204-228",{"VOID":1333},"15",{"total":23,"publishYear":1066,"statisticByYear":1335},{},"2011-08-26","2026-04-26T16:12:34.851+00:00",[60,81],[1340,1346,1349,1355,1361,1364,1370,1373,1376,1379,1382,1385,1388,1391,1397,1400,1403,1406,1409,1412,1415,1421,1424,1430,1433,1436,1442,1448,1451,1454,1460,1463,1466,1469,1472,1475,1478,1484,1490,1493,1496,1499,1505,1511,1514,1517,1520],{"id":1341,"text":1342,"url":1343,"identifiers":1344},"4c68646b-0035-4279-8000-0006b275d4fa","Andreoni, J., & Miller, J. (2002). Giving according to GARP: An experimental test of the consistency of preferences for altruism. Econometrica, 70(2), 737–753.","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10440-022-00541-7",{"doi":1345},"10.1007\u002Fs10440-022-00541-7",{"id":1341,"text":1347,"url":1343,"identifiers":1348},"Aimone, J. A., & Houser, D. (2010). What you don’t know won’t hurt you: A laboratory analysis of betrayal aversion (Working paper). George Mason University.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1350,"text":1351,"url":1352,"identifiers":1353},"1f61be77-7358-433f-975d-c9b140db3ed0","Aquino, K., & Reed, A. (2002). The self-importance of moral identity. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 83, 1423–1440.","https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.apa.org\u002Fdoi\u002F10.1037\u002F0022-3514.83.6.1423",{"doi":1354},"10.1037\u002F0022-3514.83.6.1423",{"id":1356,"text":1357,"url":1358,"identifiers":1359},"c08171ae-0882-49d7-ba7f-bc3f2b9a92fc","Ashraf, N., Bohnet, I., & Piankov, N. (2006). Decomposing trust and trustworthiness. Experimental Economics, 9(3), 193–208.","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-9122-4",{"doi":1360},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-9122-4",{"id":1341,"text":1362,"url":1343,"identifiers":1363},"Bachmann, R., & Zaheer, A. (2006). Handbook of trust research. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1365,"text":1366,"url":1367,"identifiers":1368},"eede0651-2847-4ff6-b1e7-1e21bccfb41d","Bellemare, C., & Kröger, S. (2007). On representative social capital. European Economic Review, 51, 183–202.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0014292106000456",{"doi":1369},"10.1016\u002Fj.euroecorev.2006.03.006",{"id":22,"text":1371,"url":22,"identifiers":1372},"Berg, J., Dickhaut, J., & McCabe, K. (1995). Trust, reciprocity, and social history. Games and Economic Behavior, 10, 122–142.",{},{"id":1341,"text":1374,"url":1343,"identifiers":1375},"Bohnet, I., & Zeckhauser, R. (2004). Trust, risk and betrayal. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, 467–485.",{"doi":1345},{"id":22,"text":1377,"url":22,"identifiers":1378},"Boyle, M. (2001). Performance reviews: Perilous curves ahead. Fortune 15 May.",{},{"id":1341,"text":1380,"url":1343,"identifiers":1381},"Brown, K. C., Harlow, W. V., & Starks, L. T. (1996). Of tournaments and temptations: An analysis of managerial incentives in the mutual fund industry. The Journal of Finance, 51, 85–110.",{"doi":1345},{"id":22,"text":1383,"url":22,"identifiers":1384},"Camerer, C. F. (2003). Behavioral game theory. Princeton: Princeton University Press.",{},{"id":1341,"text":1386,"url":1343,"identifiers":1387},"Chaudhuri, A., & Gangadharan, L. (2007). An experimental analysis of trust and trustworthiness. Southern Economic Journal, 73, 959–985.",{"doi":1345},{"id":22,"text":1389,"url":22,"identifiers":1390},"Csukas, C., Fracalanza, P., Kovacs, T., & Willinger, M. (2008). The determinants of trusting and reciprocal behaviour: Evidence from an intercultural experiment. Journal of Economic Development, 33, 71–95.",{},{"id":1392,"text":1393,"url":1394,"identifiers":1395},"138ef5c4-52d8-4f34-82fa-7325fa67fa46","Cochard, F., Van, P. N., & Willinger, M. (2004). Trusting behavior in a repeated investment game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55, 31–44.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0167268104000083",{"doi":1396},"10.1016\u002Fj.jebo.2003.07.004",{"id":1341,"text":1398,"url":1343,"identifiers":1399},"Dirks, K. T., & Ferrin, D. L. (2001). The role of trust in organizational settings. Organization Science, 12, 450–467.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1401,"url":1343,"identifiers":1402},"Eckel, C. C., & Wilson, R. K. (2004). Is trust a risky decision? Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 55(4), 447–465.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1404,"url":1343,"identifiers":1405},"Ferrin, D. L., & Dirks, K. T. (2003). The use of rewards to increase and decrease trust: Mediating processes and differential effects. Organization Science, 14(1), 18–32.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1407,"url":1343,"identifiers":1408},"Fukuyama, F. (1995). Trust: The social virtues and the creation of prosperity. New York: Free Press.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1410,"url":1343,"identifiers":1411},"Gaba, A., & Kalra, A. (1999). Risk behavior in response to quotas and contests. Marketing Science, 18, 417–434.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1413,"url":1343,"identifiers":1414},"Gambetta, D. (1988). Trust: Making and breaking cooperative relations. New York: Basil Blackwell.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1416,"text":1417,"url":1418,"identifiers":1419},"1cd2666c-6706-4ff1-a6d0-a0511c20c884","Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. Psychological Bulletin, 117(1), 21–38.","https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.apa.org\u002Fdoi\u002F10.1037\u002F0033-2909.117.1.21",{"doi":1420},"10.1037\u002F0033-2909.117.1.21",{"id":22,"text":1422,"url":22,"identifiers":1423},"Glaeser, E. L., Laibson, D., Scheinkman, J., & Soutter, C. (2000). Measuring trust. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115(3), 811–846.",{},{"id":1425,"text":1426,"url":1427,"identifiers":1428},"90ef1920-6bbe-4af1-bc5b-a679a4132235","Greenwald, A. G. (1980). The totalitarian ego: Fabrication and revision of personal history. The American Psychologist, 35, 603–618.","https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.apa.org\u002Fdoi\u002F10.1037\u002F0003-066X.35.7.603",{"doi":1429},"10.1037\u002F0003-066x.35.7.603",{"id":1341,"text":1431,"url":1343,"identifiers":1432},"Harbring, C. (2010). On the effect of incentive schemes on trust and trustworthiness. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 166(4), 690–714.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1434,"url":1343,"identifiers":1435},"Harbring, C., & Irlenbusch, B. (2008). How many winners are good to have? On tournaments with sabotage. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 65, 682–702.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1437,"text":1438,"url":1439,"identifiers":1440},"1f20f871-3861-4719-b30b-bdf5d42a4f9d","Hong, K., & Bohnet, I. (2007). Status and distrust: The relevance of inequality and betrayal aversion. Journal of Economic Psychology, 28, 197–213.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0167487006000559",{"doi":1441},"10.1016\u002Fj.joep.2006.06.003",{"id":1443,"text":1444,"url":1445,"identifiers":1446},"3edc9e43-3027-471c-b42f-39ae5e26587a","Houser, D., Schunk, D., & Winter, J. (2010). Distinguishing trust from risk: An anatomy of the investment game. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 74, 72–81.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0167268110000053",{"doi":1447},"10.1016\u002Fj.jebo.2010.01.002",{"id":1341,"text":1449,"url":1343,"identifiers":1450},"Hvide, H. K. (2002). Tournament rewards and risk taking. Journal of Labor Economics, 20, 877–898.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1452,"url":1343,"identifiers":1453},"Innocenti, A., & Pazienza, M. G. (2006). Altruism and gender in the trust game (Working Paper). University of Siena.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1455,"text":1456,"url":1457,"identifiers":1458},"f8751213-a98f-4dfc-b240-3d93ae298c13","Irlenbusch, B., & Ruchala, G. (2008). Relative rewards within team-based compensation. Labour Economics, 15(2), 141–167.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0927537107000176",{"doi":1459},"10.1016\u002Fj.labeco.2007.02.003",{"id":1341,"text":1461,"url":1343,"identifiers":1462},"Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M. Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases trust in humans. Nature, 435, 673–676.",{"doi":1345},{"id":22,"text":1464,"url":22,"identifiers":1465},"Kramer, R. M., & Tyler, T. R. (1996). Trust in organizations: Frontiers of theory and research. Thousand Oaks: Sage.",{},{"id":1341,"text":1467,"url":1343,"identifiers":1468},"Ku, G., Malhotra, D., & Murnighan, J. K. (2005). Towards a competitive arousal model of decision-making: A study of auction fever in live and internet auctions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 96(2), 89–103.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1470,"url":1343,"identifiers":1471},"Kumra, S., & Vinnicombe, S. (2008). A study of the promotion to partner process in a professional services firm: How women are disadvantaged. British Journal of Management, 19(1), 65–74.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1473,"url":1343,"identifiers":1474},"Lazear, E. P. (1989). Pay equality and industrial politics. Journal of Political Economy, 97, 561–580.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1476,"url":1343,"identifiers":1477},"Lazear, E. P., & Rosen, S. (1981). Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts. Journal of Political Economics, 89(5), 843–864.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1479,"text":1480,"url":1481,"identifiers":1482},"5f73c0d6-d16d-4c70-9bf5-ef2a03126fa6","Malhotra, D. (2010). The desire to win: The effects of competitive arousal on motivation and behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 111, 139–146.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS074959780900106X",{"doi":1483},"10.1016\u002Fj.obhdp.2009.11.005",{"id":1485,"text":1486,"url":1487,"identifiers":1488},"29e396a9-a119-47b3-926d-e00b8e69e666","McCabe, K., Rigdon, M., & Smith, V. (2003). Positive reciprocity and intentions in trust games. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 52(2), 267–275.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0167268103000039",{"doi":1489},"10.1016\u002Fs0167-2681(03)00003-9",{"id":22,"text":1491,"url":22,"identifiers":1492},"Monin, B., & Jordan, A. H. (2009). Dynamic moral identity: A social psychological perspective. In D. Narvaez & D. Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character: explorations in moral psychology (pp. 341–354). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.",{},{"id":1341,"text":1494,"url":1343,"identifiers":1495},"Murphy, K. (1998). Executive compensation. In O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (Eds.), Handbook of labor economics (Vol. 3). Amsterdam: North Holland.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1497,"url":1343,"identifiers":1498},"Rosen, S. (1986). Prizes and incentives in elimination tournaments. American Economic Review, 76, 701–715.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1500,"text":1501,"url":1502,"identifiers":1503},"c950b7d4-1305-4449-8f96-9cf7a4087053","Schotter, A., & Sopher, B. (2006). Trust and trustworthiness in games: An experimental study of intergenerational advice. Experimental Economics, 9, 123–145.","http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-5386-y",{"doi":1504},"10.1007\u002Fs10683-006-5386-y",{"id":1506,"text":1507,"url":1508,"identifiers":1509},"31ebe376-dfe8-44a0-a9ad-1f70571b76f2","Schwieren, C., & Weichselbaumer, D. (2010). Does competition enhance performance or cheating? A laboratory experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology, 31(3), 241–253.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.sciencedirect.com\u002Fscience\u002Farticle\u002Fpii\u002FS0167487009000336",{"doi":1510},"10.1016\u002Fj.joep.2009.02.005",{"id":1341,"text":1512,"url":1343,"identifiers":1513},"Tjosvold, D. (1982). Effects of cooperative and competitive interdependence and task complexity on subordinates’ productivity, perception of leader, and group development. Canadian Journal of Behavioral Sciences, 14(1), 24–34.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1515,"url":1343,"identifiers":1516},"Tjosvold, D. (1985). Dynamics within participation: An experimental investigation. Group and Organisational Studies, 10(3), 260–277.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1518,"url":1343,"identifiers":1519},"Tor, A., & Bazerman, M. H. (2003). Focusing failures in competitive environments: Explaining decision errors in the Monty Hall game, the Acquiring a Company game, and multiparty ultimatums. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 16, 353–374.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1341,"text":1521,"url":1343,"identifiers":1522},"Willinger, M., Keser, C., Lohmann, C., & Usunier, J. (2003). A comparison of trust and reciprocity between France and Germany: Experimental investigation based on the investment game. Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 447–466.",{"doi":1345},{"id":1524,"createTime":1525,"updateTime":1526,"relativeEntities":1527,"slug":1528,"properties":1529,"entityType":127,"verifyStatus":128,"verifyTime":1540,"verifyNote":129,"languages":1541,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":1542,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":1543,"publicationType":155,"publisherRelationship":1601,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":1650,"publishDate":1653,"publishYear":1651,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":1654,"indexDatabases":1655,"openAccess":22,"references":1656,"isForceReanalyzing":242},"2ad59319-3dd6-4613-80be-bff841dd419b","2024-04-20T01:31:57.685+00:00","2026-04-24T14:07:24.030+00:00",[],"Experimental-Methods-and-Elicitation-of-Values",{"openalex":1530,"mag":1532,"title":1534,"gsPaper":1536,"doi":1538},{"VOID":1531},"W3125556351",{"VOID":1533},"3125556351",{"EN":1535},"Experimental Methods and Elicitation of Values",{"VOID":1537},"[\"5901722824307046056\"]",{"VOID":1539},"10.1023\u002Fb:exec.0000026975.48587.f0","2024-05-13T02:18:46.584+00:00",[131],"http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1023\u002FB:EXEC.0000026975.48587.f0",[1544,1563,1582],{"id":1545,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":1546,"affiliations":1547,"properties":1556,"displayName":1558,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"923cc00e-a824-49ef-86a1-2a50ab2296ce",[],[1548],{"id":1549,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1550,"properties":22},"24fafaef-feab-4584-991f-16cdbd231b09",{"id":1549,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1551,"slug":22,"properties":1552,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1555,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1553},{"VI":1554},"Department of Economics, College of Business Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando, USA",[],{"title":1557,"gsAuthor":1559,"openalex":1561},{"EN":1558},"Glen Harrison",{"VOID":1560},"[\"wJ4JTeYAAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":1562},"A5037991874",{"id":1564,"sortIndex":103,"researcher":22,"roles":1565,"affiliations":1566,"properties":1575,"displayName":1577,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"969f2bd2-df10-4d59-8526-9562d2a4f353",[],[1567],{"id":1568,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1569,"properties":22},"eb942249-6e1c-4c2b-8f7f-0b16f12de6f3",{"id":1568,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1570,"slug":22,"properties":1571,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1574,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1572},{"VI":1573},"Department of Economics, University of Missouri-Columbia, Columbia, USA",[],{"title":1576,"gsAuthor":1578,"openalex":1580},{"EN":1577},"Ronald M. Harstad",{"VOID":1579},"[\"D15sGD0AAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":1581},"A5002821583",{"id":1583,"sortIndex":506,"researcher":22,"roles":1584,"affiliations":1585,"properties":1592,"displayName":1596,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"a824eb52-c81d-4840-b501-84f515005b70",[],[1586],{"id":1549,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1587,"properties":22},{"id":1549,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1588,"slug":22,"properties":1589,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1591,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1590},{"VI":1554},[],{"orcid":1593,"title":1595,"gsAuthor":1597,"openalex":1599},{"VOID":1594},"https:\u002F\u002Forcid.org\u002F0000-0001-8616-3318",{"EN":1596},"E. Elisabet Rutström",{"VOID":1598},"[\"EHSVmZ8AAAAJ\"]",{"VOID":1600},"A5071935875",{"url":22,"publisher":1602,"properties":1644},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1603,"slug":10,"properties":1604,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1608,"manageAffiliations":1613,"indexDatabases":1624,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1639,"gsStatistic":22,"type":106,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1605,"title":1606,"eissn":1607},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1609],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1610,"label":1611,"description":1612,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1614,1619],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1615,"slug":22,"properties":1616,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1618,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1617},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1620,"slug":22,"properties":1621,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1623,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1622},{"EN":45},[],[1625,1632],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1626,"url":62,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1631,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1627,"label":1628,"description":1629,"key":58,"publicationTags":1630,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":56,"VI":57},[60,61],[64],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1633,"url":77,"indexYears":78,"academicFieldIds":1638,"indexDatabaseRanking":81},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1634,"label":1635,"description":1636,"key":74,"publicationTags":1637,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":71,"VI":73},[76],[80],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1640,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1641,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1642,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1643,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"1998":86,"1999":87,"2000":86,"2001":87,"2002":88,"2003":86,"2004":89,"2005":90,"2006":91,"2007":92,"2008":86,"2009":93,"2010":94,"2011":95,"2012":96,"2013":92,"2014":97,"2015":98,"2016":94,"2017":99,"2018":96,"2019":96,"2020":99,"2021":100,"2022":101,"2023":102,"2024":103},{},{},{"issue":1645,"pages":1646,"volume":1648},{"VOID":201},{"VOID":1647},"123-140",{"VOID":1649},"7",{"total":23,"publishYear":1651,"statisticByYear":1652},2004,{},"2004-06-01","2026-04-24T14:07:24.029+00:00",[60,81],[]]