[{"data":1,"prerenderedAt":-1},["ShallowReactive",2],{"_public_publisher_byId_a58dcc64-4a79-42da-8225-3f8bef7e8d1a":3,"_public_publication_all{\"sortAscending\":false,\"sortField\":\"updateTime\",\"page\":0,\"size\":10,\"facet\":true,\"searchKey\":\"publisherId:a58dcc64-4a79-42da-8225-3f8bef7e8d1a,\"}":92},{"code":4,"data":5,"meta":22},"SUCCESS",{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":9,"slug":10,"properties":11,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":24,"manageAffiliations":31,"indexDatabases":47,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":82,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},"a58dcc64-4a79-42da-8225-3f8bef7e8d1a","2024-04-06T04:22:14.134+00:00","2025-11-21T10:03:26.397+00:00",[],"Acta-Analytica",{"eissn":12,"issn":14,"title":16,"url":18},{"VOID":13},"03535150",{"VOID":15},"18746349",{"EN":17},"Acta Analytica",{"VOID":19},"https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Fjournal\u002F12136","PUBLISHER","PENDING",null,0,[25],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":27,"label":28,"description":30,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},"5f4f972e-e374-46bb-a968-8d8e13c85a9c",[],{"EN":29},"Philosophy",{},[32,40],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":34,"slug":22,"properties":35,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":38,"statistic":22},"b2bfac93-563a-4fa4-bd81-e546a66bf9bd",[],{"title":36},{"EN":37},"Springer Netherlands",[39],"9a7c7208-b28a-42c2-a634-5a7f90eee3ab",{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":42,"slug":22,"properties":43,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":46,"statistic":22},"26a19206-5cad-4456-bb2f-49abd254fbc6",[],{"title":44},{"EN":45},"SPRINGER",[],[48,65],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":50,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":62,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},"715439bf-20a1-4e27-8e79-e1258f8cebba",{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":52,"label":53,"description":55,"key":57,"publicationTags":58,"standard":22},"3c7051d4-eb7d-4c57-a56b-36fc74c5d1e9",[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},"Scopus - Elsevier",{"EN":54,"VI":56},"Cơ sở dữ liệu Scopus thuộc Elsevier","scopus",[59],"SCOPUS","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.scopus.com\u002Fsourceid\u002F19400158711","2009-2025",[63],"6dce782c-a320-4b2c-a12d-3a1d2dd48d39","SCOPUS__Q1",{"id":66,"indexDatabase":67,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":80,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},"d5dab8b9-ccfe-41a8-b0b7-0012e75ac12e",{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":69,"label":70,"description":72,"key":75,"publicationTags":76,"standard":22},"3a2608d0-2d5e-4ddf-bcdb-b5cdcb2e7393",[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},"ISI\u002FAHCI - Arts & Humanities Citation Index",{"EN":73,"VI":74},"AHCI database","Cơ sở dữ liệu AHCI","ahci",[77,78],"AHCI","ISI","https:\u002F\u002Fmjl.clarivate.com\u002Fsearch-results?issn=0353-5150",[81],"d60d3208-44aa-4f43-ac00-2d486f2f69ed",{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":83,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":85,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":89,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":90,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},10,{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},1,2,3,{},{},"JOURNAL",{"meta":93,"data":95},{"total":94},"458",[96,190,438,533,619,708,795,989,1075,1227],{"id":97,"createTime":98,"updateTime":99,"relativeEntities":100,"slug":101,"properties":102,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":115,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":117,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":118,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":138,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":184,"publishYear":185,"citationAnalyzeStatus":186,"lastCitationAnalyze":187,"indexDatabases":188,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"54dd4123-29fe-4010-8103-325c5b529abb","2023-12-26T11:19:53.871+00:00","2026-08-24T21:08:31.759+00:00",[],"On-Whether-It-Is-and-What-It-Is",{"abstract":103,"title":105,"gsPaper":107,"references":109,"doi":111},{"EN":104},"This dialogue, taking place between Prof. Whether and Prof. What, focuses on the nature of the relationship between ontology, conceived as the branch of philosophy concerned with the question of what entities exist, and metaphysics, conceived as the complementary part of philosophy that seeks to explain, of those entities, what they are. Most philosophers claim that it is not possible to address the first question without at the same time addressing the second, since knowing whether an entity exists requires knowing what that entity is. Prof. Whether argues against this popular position and offers a detailed analysis of the idea according to which it is possible to do ontology without engaging in metaphysics. Prof. Whether and Prof. What agree that, rather than being merely possible, in some cases it is, for methodological reasons, even preferable to start with a metaphysics-free ontology, postponing any inquiry concerning the nature of the entities included in the ontological inventory to a later stage. However, Prof. What notes that it is not always possible to do ontology without metaphysics, because there are certain kinds of entities, such as universals and possible worlds, that necessarily need a prior metaphysical characterization.",{"EN":106},"On Whether It Is and What It Is",{"VOID":108},"[\"15172944358015531469\"]",{"VOID":110},"Aquinas, T. (1952). Summa theologica. Translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, revised by D. J. Sullivan. Chicago: Encyclopædia Britannica.\nAquinas, T. (1968). On being and essence. Translated by A. A. Maurer. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies.\nAristotle. (1984). The complete works of Aristotle. The revised Oxford translation. Edited by J. Barnes. Princeton and Guildford: Princeton University Press.\nArmstrong, D. M. (1992). Properties. In K. Mulligan (Ed.), Language, truth and ontology (pp. 14–27). Reidel.\nCarnap, R. (1956). Meaning and necessity: A study in semantics and modal logic. University of Chicago Press.\nLewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Blackwell Publisher.\nLoux, M. J., & Crisp, T. M. (2017). Metaphysics: A contemporary introduction. Routledge.\nMaimonides, M. (1956). The guide for the perplexed (2nd ed.). Translated by M. Friedländer. London: Routledge & Kegan.\nMarconi, D. (1997). Lexical competence. MIT Press.\nPlantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford University Press.\nPlato. (1985). Meno. Edited with translation and notes by R. W. Sharples. Warminster: Aris & Phillips.\nPorphyry. (2003). Introduction. Translated with a commentary by J. Barnes. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nQuine, W. V. O. (1948). On what there is. The Review of Metaphysics, 2(5), 21–38.\nSider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford University Press.\nThomasson, A. L. (1999). Fiction and metaphysics. Cambridge University Press.\nVarzi, A. C. (2011). On doing ontology without metaphysics. Philosophical Perspectives, 25, 407–423.\nWhite, M. (1956). Toward reunion in philosophy. Harvard University Press.",{"VOID":112},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-023-00573-0","PUBLICATION","VERIFIED","2024-05-16T02:19:59.865+00:00","Auto Verify","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-023-00573-0",[119],{"id":120,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":121,"affiliations":123,"properties":132,"displayName":134,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"0dd1c15d-cc08-4f2f-90bb-0b40a7d4d09d",[122],"AUTHOR",[124],{"id":125,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":126,"properties":22},"c07597b6-af55-463b-8055-ae8c08723c61",{"id":125,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":127,"slug":22,"properties":128,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":131,"statistic":22},[],{"title":129},{"VI":130},"Institute of Philosophy, University of Neuchâtel, Neuchâtel, Switzerland",[],{"title":133,"gsAuthor":135},{"VI":134},"Francesco Franda",{"VOID":136},"[\"pyf8vLAAAAAJ\"]","ARTICLE",{"url":117,"publisher":139,"properties":181},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":140,"slug":10,"properties":141,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":145,"manageAffiliations":150,"indexDatabases":161,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":176,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":142,"title":143,"eissn":144},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[146],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":147,"label":148,"description":149,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[151,156],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":152,"slug":22,"properties":153,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":155,"statistic":22},[],{"title":154},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":157,"slug":22,"properties":158,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":160,"statistic":22},[],{"title":159},{"EN":45},[],[162,169],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":163,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":168,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":164,"label":165,"description":166,"key":57,"publicationTags":167,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":170,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":175,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":171,"label":172,"description":173,"key":75,"publicationTags":174,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":177,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":178,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":179,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":180,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":182},{"VOID":183},"1-12","2023-11-07",2023,"ERROR_IN_ANALYZE_CITATION","2026-08-24T21:08:31.758+00:00",[77,64],false,{"id":191,"createTime":192,"updateTime":193,"relativeEntities":194,"slug":195,"properties":196,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":205,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":206,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":207,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":225,"citationCount":86,"citationInfo":271,"publishDate":273,"publishYear":185,"citationAnalyzeStatus":274,"lastCitationAnalyze":275,"indexDatabases":276,"openAccess":22,"references":277,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"86b716ed-93b3-44f7-8021-e912377a54ad","2023-12-20T23:12:05.479+00:00","2026-07-28T12:16:52.432+00:00",[],"What-Matters-in-Survival-Self-Determination-and-the-Continuity-of-Life-Trajectories",{"abstract":197,"title":199,"gsPaper":201,"doi":203},{"EN":198},"In this paper, I argue that standard psychological continuity theory does not account for an important feature of what is important in survival—having the property of personhood. I offer a theory that can account for this, and I explain how it avoids the implausible consequences of standard psychological continuity theory, as well as having certain other advantages over that theory.",{"EN":200},"What Matters in Survival: Self-Determination and the Continuity of Life Trajectories",{"VOID":202},"[\"15921704972298119256\"]",{"VOID":204},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-023-00567-y","2024-04-29T00:31:08.735+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-023-00567-y",[208],{"id":209,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":210,"affiliations":211,"properties":220,"displayName":222,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"c3f3d4fd-7873-4c37-ac94-a41ad802b74d",[122],[212],{"id":213,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":214,"properties":22},"40d8f6b6-2ec3-4264-80e5-1c7d335f0abe",{"id":213,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":215,"slug":22,"properties":216,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":219,"statistic":22},[],{"title":217},{"VI":218},"York, USA",[],{"title":221,"gsAuthor":223},{"VI":222},"Heidi Erika Savage",{"VOID":224},"[\"a3OBFmMAAAAJ\"]",{"url":206,"publisher":226,"properties":268},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":227,"slug":10,"properties":228,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":232,"manageAffiliations":237,"indexDatabases":248,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":263,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":229,"title":230,"eissn":231},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[233],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":234,"label":235,"description":236,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[238,243],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":239,"slug":22,"properties":240,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":242,"statistic":22},[],{"title":241},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":244,"slug":22,"properties":245,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":247,"statistic":22},[],{"title":246},{"EN":45},[],[249,256],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":250,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":255,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":251,"label":252,"description":253,"key":57,"publicationTags":254,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":257,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":262,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":258,"label":259,"description":260,"key":75,"publicationTags":261,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":264,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":265,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":266,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":267,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":269},{"VOID":270},"1-20",{"total":86,"publishYear":185,"statisticByYear":272},{"2024":86},"2023-09-30","DONE_ANALYZE_CITATION","2026-07-28T12:16:52.431+00:00",[77,64],[278,284,287,290,293,296,299,302,305,308,311,314,317,320,323,330,333,336,339,342,345,348,351,354,357,360,363,366,369,372,378,381,384,392,399,402,405,408,411,414,417,420,423,426,429,432,435],{"id":279,"text":280,"url":281,"identifiers":282},"4c68646b-0035-4279-8000-0006b275d4fa","Belzer, M. (2005). Self-conception and personal identity: Revisiting Parfit and Lewis with an eye on the grip of the unity reaction. Social Philosophy and Policy, 22(2), 126–164.","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10440-022-00541-7",{"doi":283},"10.1007\u002Fs10440-022-00541-7",{"id":279,"text":285,"url":281,"identifiers":286},"Burge, T. (1979). Individualism and the Mental. Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 4(1), 73–122.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":288,"url":281,"identifiers":289},"Butler, J. (1736). The analogy of religion natural and revealed, to the constitution and course of nature, to which are added two brief dissertations: - Of personal identity; Of the nature of virtue. Knapton",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":291,"url":22,"identifiers":292},"Butler, J. (1896). Editor W.E. Gladstone. Oxford: Oxford University Press",{},{"id":279,"text":294,"url":281,"identifiers":295},"Carroll, J. (2011). Self-visitation, traveler time, and compatible properties. Canadian Journal of Philosophy., 41, 359–370.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":297,"url":22,"identifiers":298},"Chalmers, D. (2010). The singularity: A philosophical analysis. Journal of Consciousness Studies., 17, 7–65.",{},{"id":279,"text":300,"url":281,"identifiers":301},"Demarest, H. (2016). Fission may kill you (but not for the reasons you thought). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research., 92(3), 565–582.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":303,"url":281,"identifiers":304},"Ehring, D. (1995). Personal identity and the R-relation: Reconciliation through cohabitation? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 73(3), 337–346.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":306,"url":22,"identifiers":307},"Gallagher, S. (2007). Moral agency, self-concsiousness, and pratical wisdom. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 14(5–6), 199–223.",{},{"id":279,"text":309,"url":281,"identifiers":310},"Garrett, B. (1998). Personal identity and self-consciousness. London: Routledge.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":312,"url":22,"identifiers":313},"Johansson, J. (2010). Parfit on fission. Philosophical Studies., 150, 21–35.",{},{"id":279,"text":315,"url":281,"identifiers":316},"Korsgaard, C. M. (1989). Personal identity and the unity of agency: A Kantian response to Parfit. Philosophy and Public Affairs, 18(2), 109–123.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":318,"url":22,"identifiers":319},"Lewis, D. (1973). Counterfactuals. MA: Harvard University Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":321,"url":281,"identifiers":322},"Lewis, D. (1983). Survival and identity. Philosophical Works (Vol. 1, pp. 55–78). Oxford: Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":324,"text":325,"url":326,"identifiers":327},"ace2bf40-dc47-4d44-98bd-c479331e3dcc","Locke, J. (1694). An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, In: P. H. Nidditch (Ed.)., Oxford: Oxford University Press (1975).","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.goodreads.com\u002Fbook\u002Fshow\u002F1003890.An_Essay_Concerning_Human_Understanding",{"isbn":328,"isbn13":329},"087220216X","9780872202160",{"id":22,"text":331,"url":22,"identifiers":332},"Locke, J. (1690). An Essay Concerning Humane Understanding (1st ed.). 1 vols. London: Thomas Basset.",{},{"id":279,"text":334,"url":281,"identifiers":335},"Lycan, W. (2001). A simple argument for a higher-order representation theory of consciousness. Analysis, 61, 3–4.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":337,"url":281,"identifiers":338},"Martin, R. (1995). Fission Rejuvenation. Philosophical Studies, 80(1), 17–40.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":340,"url":22,"identifiers":341},"McDowell, John. (1997). Reductionism and the first-person. In J. Dancy (Ed.), Reading Parfit (pp. 230–250). Oxford: Blackwell Publishers.",{},{"id":22,"text":343,"url":22,"identifiers":344},"Mead, G. H. (1913). The social self. Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods, 10, 374–380.",{},{"id":279,"text":346,"url":281,"identifiers":347},"Nozick, R. (1998). The experience machine. In L. Pojman (Ed.), Ethical theory: classical and contemporary reading (pp. 152–53). Wadsworth Publishing Co.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":349,"url":281,"identifiers":350},"Olson, E. T. (1997). The human animal: Personal identity without psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":352,"url":22,"identifiers":353},"Parfit, D. (1971). Personal identity. The Philosophical Review, 80, 3–27.",{},{"id":22,"text":355,"url":22,"identifiers":356},"Parfit, D. (1984). Reasons and persons. Oxford: Clarendon Press.",{},{"id":22,"text":358,"url":22,"identifiers":359},"Parfit, D. (1995). The unimportance of identity (Identity, pp. 13–45). Oxford: Oxford University Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":361,"url":281,"identifiers":362},"Parfit, D. (1999). Experiences, subjects, and conceptual schemes. Philosophical Topics, 26(1\u002F2), 217–270.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":364,"url":281,"identifiers":365},"Parfit, D. (2012). We are not human beings. Philosophy, 87(1), 5–28.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":367,"url":281,"identifiers":368},"Perry, J. (1972). Can the self divide? Journal of Philosophy, 69, 463–488.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":370,"url":281,"identifiers":371},"Perry, J. (1976). The importance of being identical. In A. O. Rorty (Ed.), The identities of persons. University of California Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":373,"text":374,"url":375,"identifiers":376},"bf425120-6c02-4437-a521-b23d2150c6b5","Rosenthal, D. (1986). Two concepts of consciousness. Philosophical Studies, 49, 329–359.","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002FBF00355521",{"doi":377},"10.1007\u002FBF00355521",{"id":279,"text":379,"url":281,"identifiers":380},"Rovane, C. (1998). The bounds of agency: An work in revisionary metaphysics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":382,"url":22,"identifiers":383},"Rudder Baker, L. (1999). What am I? Philosophical and Phenomenological Research., 59(1), 151–159.",{},{"id":22,"text":385,"url":386,"identifiers":387},"Sauchelli, A. (2017). Life-extending enhancements and the narrative approach to personal identity. Journal of Medical Ethics. https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1136\u002Fmedethics-2016-103923","https:\u002F\u002Fdoi.org\u002F10.1136\u002Fmedethics-2016-103923",{"mag":388,"openalex":389,"pm":390,"doi":391},"2766780960","W2766780960","29079558","10.1136\u002Fmedethics-2016-103923",{"id":393,"text":394,"url":395,"identifiers":396},"838deab3-0924-4c70-97a4-22f357492643","Schechtman, M. (1996). The constitution of selves. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.goodreads.com\u002Fbook\u002Fshow\u002F2571866-the-constitution-of-selves",{"isbn":397,"isbn13":398},"0801474175","9780801474170",{"id":279,"text":400,"url":281,"identifiers":401},"Schechtman, M. (2001). Philosophical explorations. Van Gorcum Publishers.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":403,"url":281,"identifiers":404},"Schechtman, M. (2001b). Empathic access: The missing ingredient personal identity. Philosophical Explorations., 4(2), 95–111.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":406,"url":281,"identifiers":407},"Schechtman, M. (2014). Staying alive: Personal identity, practical concerns, and the unity of a life. Oxford: Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":409,"url":281,"identifiers":410},"Shoemaker, S. (1970). Persons and their pasts. American Philosophical Quarterly, 7, 269–285.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":412,"url":281,"identifiers":413},"Sidelle, A. (2011). Parfit on ‘the normal\u002Fa reliable\u002Fany cause’ of relation R. Mind, 120(479), 735–760.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":415,"url":22,"identifiers":416},"Strawson, G. (1997). The self. Journal of Consciousness Studies., 4(5–6), 405–428.",{},{"id":279,"text":418,"url":281,"identifiers":419},"Unger, P. (1990). Identity, consciousness, and value. Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":421,"url":281,"identifiers":422},"Whiting, J. (2002). Personal identity: the non-branching for of “what matters”. In The Blackwell Guide to metaphysics. R. M. Gale (Ed.) Blackwell Publishers. Oxford. pp, 190–218",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":424,"url":281,"identifiers":425},"Wiggins, D. (1967). Identity and spatio-temporal continuity. Oxford",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":427,"url":281,"identifiers":428},"Williams, B. (1970). The self and the future. Philosophical Review, 79(2), 161–180.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":430,"url":281,"identifiers":431},"Williams, B. (1976). Problems of the self. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":433,"url":22,"identifiers":434},"Wilson, R. A. (2005). Persons, agency, and constitution. Social Philosophy and Policy., 22(2), 49–69.",{},{"id":279,"text":436,"url":281,"identifiers":437},"Wolf, S. (1990). Freedom within reason. Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":439,"createTime":440,"updateTime":441,"relativeEntities":442,"slug":443,"properties":444,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":455,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":456,"fullTextUrl":457,"authors":458,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":476,"citationCount":526,"citationInfo":527,"publishDate":530,"publishYear":528,"citationAnalyzeStatus":274,"lastCitationAnalyze":531,"indexDatabases":532,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"54d7f399-f61a-4ad2-8108-59498c8837b5","2024-01-28T09:27:22.144+00:00","2026-07-25T00:11:17.640+00:00",[],"Against-Phenomenal-Conservatism",{"abstract":445,"title":447,"gsPaper":449,"references":451,"doi":453},{"EN":446},"Recently, Michael Huemer has defended the Principle of Phenomenal Conservatism: If it seems to S that p, then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has at least some degree of justification for believing that p. This principle has potentially far-reaching implications. Huemer uses it to argue against skepticism and to defend a version of ethical intuitionism. I employ a reductio to show that PC is false. If PC is true, beliefs can yield justification for believing their contents in cases where, intuitively, they should not be able to do so. I argue that there are cases where a belief that p can behave like an appearance that p and thereby make it seem to one that p.",{"EN":448},"Against Phenomenal Conservatism",{"VOID":450},"[\"10910072169298215683\"]",{"VOID":452},"citation_journal_title=American Philosophical Quarterly; citation_title=Varieties of privileged access; citation_author=W Alston; citation_volume=8; citation_publication_date=1971; citation_pages=223-241; citation_id=CR1\ncitation_journal_title=Philosophical Perspectives; citation_title=The deontological conception of epistemic justification; citation_author=W Alston; citation_volume=2; citation_publication_date=1988; citation_pages=257-299; citation_doi=10.2307\u002F2214077; citation_id=CR2\ncitation_journal_title=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; citation_title=A theory of the a priori; citation_author=G Bealer; citation_volume=81; citation_publication_date=2000; citation_pages=1-30; citation_doi=10.1111\u002F1468-0114.00092; citation_id=CR3\ncitation_title=Theory of knowledge; citation_publication_date=1977; citation_id=CR4; citation_author=R Chisholm; citation_publisher=Prentice Hall\ncitation_journal_title=Philosophical Studies; citation_title=Epistemic conservatism; citation_author=R Foley; citation_volume=43; citation_publication_date=1983; citation_pages=165-182; citation_doi=10.1007\u002FBF00372381; citation_id=CR5\ncitation_journal_title=Mind; citation_title=Deciding to believe again; citation_author=K Frankish; citation_volume=116; citation_publication_date=2007; citation_pages=523-547; citation_doi=10.1093\u002Fmind\u002Ffzm523; citation_id=CR6\ncitation_journal_title=Pacific Philosophical Quarterly; citation_title=Controlling attitudes; citation_author=P Hieronymi; citation_volume=87; citation_publication_date=2006; citation_pages=45-74; citation_doi=10.1111\u002Fj.1468-0114.2006.00247.x; citation_id=CR7\nHuemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Rowman and Littlefield.\ncitation_title=Ethical intuitionism; citation_publication_date=2005; citation_id=CR9; citation_author=M Huemer; citation_publisher=Palgrave Macmillan\ncitation_journal_title=American Philosophical Quarterly; citation_title=Phenomenal conservatism and the internalist intuition; citation_author=M Huemer; citation_volume=43; citation_publication_date=2006; citation_pages=147-158; citation_id=CR10\ncitation_journal_title=Philosophy and Phenomenological Research; citation_title=Compassionate phenomenal conservatism; citation_author=M Huemer; citation_volume=74; citation_publication_date=2007; citation_pages=30-55; citation_doi=10.1111\u002Fj.1933-1592.2007.00002.x; citation_id=CR11\ncitation_journal_title=Philosophical Studies; citation_title=The mystery of direct perceptual justification; citation_author=P Markie; citation_volume=126; citation_publication_date=2005; citation_pages=347-373; citation_doi=10.1007\u002Fs11098-004-7795-0; citation_id=CR12\ncitation_journal_title=American Philosophical Quarterly; citation_title=Seemings; citation_author=W Tolhurst; citation_volume=35; citation_publication_date=1998; citation_pages=293-302; citation_id=CR13",{"VOID":454},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-010-0111-z","2024-05-16T17:59:54.740+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-010-0111-z","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Fcontent\u002Fpdf\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-010-0111-z.pdf",[459],{"id":460,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":461,"affiliations":462,"properties":471,"displayName":473,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"707ea1dc-ff4e-422b-8235-5ae223863a5a",[122],[463],{"id":464,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":465,"properties":22},"fe5fcecb-dead-40ea-9a0c-8b18c7e183d0",{"id":464,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":466,"slug":22,"properties":467,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":470,"statistic":22},[],{"title":468},{"VI":469},"Philosophy Department, Lawrence University, Appleton, USA",[],{"title":472,"gsAuthor":474},{"VI":473},"Hanna, Nathan",{"VOID":475},"[\"Rzj7NTIAAAAJ\"]",{"url":456,"publisher":477,"properties":519},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":478,"slug":10,"properties":479,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":483,"manageAffiliations":488,"indexDatabases":499,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":514,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":480,"title":481,"eissn":482},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[484],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":485,"label":486,"description":487,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[489,494],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":490,"slug":22,"properties":491,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":493,"statistic":22},[],{"title":492},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":495,"slug":22,"properties":496,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":498,"statistic":22},[],{"title":497},{"EN":45},[],[500,507],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":501,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":506,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":502,"label":503,"description":504,"key":57,"publicationTags":505,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":508,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":513,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":509,"label":510,"description":511,"key":75,"publicationTags":512,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":515,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":516,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":517,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":518,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"issue":520,"pages":522,"volume":524},{"VOID":521},"3",{"VOID":523},"213-221",{"VOID":525},"26",21,{"total":526,"publishYear":528,"statisticByYear":529},2011,{"2012":86,"2013":88,"2014":86,"2015":87,"2017":87,"2018":88,"2019":87,"2020":87,"2021":86,"2022":86,"2023":87,"2025":86},"2011-09-01","2026-07-25T00:11:17.639+00:00",[77,64],{"id":534,"createTime":535,"updateTime":536,"relativeEntities":537,"slug":538,"properties":539,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":550,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":551,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":552,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":568,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":615,"publishDate":617,"publishYear":528,"citationAnalyzeStatus":274,"lastCitationAnalyze":536,"indexDatabases":618,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"c5eb7946-9bb9-4f3f-810f-5a5d3d887e9f","2024-01-08T14:55:58.719+00:00","2026-07-11T10:47:15.461+00:00",[],"Expressing-and-Describing-Experiences-A-Case-of-Showing-Versus-Saying",{"abstract":540,"title":542,"gsPaper":544,"references":546,"doi":548},{"EN":541},"Experiences are interpreted as conscious mental occurrences that are of phenomenal character. There is already a kind of (weak) intentionality involved with this phenomenal interpretation. A stricter conception of experiences distinguishes between purely phenomenal experiences and intentional experiences in a narrow sense. Wittgenstein’s account of psychological (experiential) verbs is taken over: Usually, expressing mental states verbally is not describing them. According to this, “I believe” can be seen as an expression of one’s own belief, but not as an expression of a belief about one’s belief. Hence, the utterance “I believe it is raining” shows that I believe that it is raining, although it is not said by these words that I believe that it is raining. Thinking thoughts such as “I believe it is raining, but it is not raining” (a variant of Moore’s paradox) is an absurdity between what is already said by silently uttering “It is not raining” and what is shown by silently uttering “I believe it is raining.” The paper agrees with a main result of Wittgenstein’s considerations of Moore’s paradox, namely the view that logical structure, deducibility, and consistency cannot be reduced solely to propositions—besides a logic of propositions, there is, for example, a logic of assertions and of imperatives, respectively.",{"EN":543},"Expressing and Describing Experiences. A Case of Showing Versus Saying",{"VOID":545},"[\"5905577108321120679\"]",{"VOID":547},"Chisholm, R. (1989). On metaphysics. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.\nChisholm, R. (1996). A realistic theory of categories: An essay on ontology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nKriegel, U. (2004). Moore’s paradox and the structure of conscious belief. Erkenntnis, 61(1), 99–121.\nMoore, G. E. (1942). A reply to my critics. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The philosophy of G. E. Moore (pp. 533–677). Evanston and Chicago: Northwestern University.\nMoore, G. E. (1944). Russell’s theory of descriptions. In P. A. Schilpp (Ed.), The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, Vol. I (pp. 175–225). New York, Evanston, London: Harper and Row, 31963.\nRosenthal, D. M. (1995). Self-knowledge and Moore's paradox. Philosophical Studies, 77(2–3), 195–209.\nSchroeder, S. (2006). Moore’s paradox and first-person authority. In M. Kober (Ed.), Deepening our understanding of Wittgenstein (pp. 161–174). Amsterdam – New York: Rodopi (= Grazer Philosophische Studien, 71).\nShoemaker, S. (1995). Moore’s paradox and self-knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 77(2–3), 211–228.\nWilliams, J. N. (2006). Moore’s paradoxes and conscious belief. Philosophical Studies, 127, 383–414.\nWilliams, J. N. (1998). Wittgensteinian accounts of Moorean absurdity. Philosophical Studies, 92, 283–306.\nWittgenstein, L. (1958). Philosophical investigations (2nd ed.). Oxford: Blackwell. (First published 1953.) [= PI I and PI II, respectively].\nWittgenstein, L. (1980a). Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (Vol. I). Oxford: Blackwell [= RPP I].\nWittgenstein, L. (1980b). Remarks on the philosophy of psychology (Vol. II). Oxford: Blackwell [= RPP II].\nWittgenstein, L. (1946). Typed from manuscript Catalogue No. 132. (9. 9. 1946–22. 10. 1946). [= MS 132]\nWittgenstein, L. (1949). “MS 169” (around 1949). In L. Wittgenstein, Last Writings on the Philosophy of Psychology, Vol. II, The Inner and the Outer, 1949–1951. 1–49. [= MS 169]",{"VOID":549},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-010-0119-4","2024-06-24T14:06:49.336+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-010-0119-4",[553],{"id":554,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":555,"affiliations":556,"properties":565,"displayName":567,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"0be602ab-dbe9-49dc-9873-f520c5518624",[122],[557],{"id":558,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":559,"properties":22},"7a69c14f-450c-4f37-831e-16760f45bedc",{"id":558,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":560,"slug":22,"properties":561,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":564,"statistic":22},[],{"title":562},{"VI":563},"Institut für Philosophie, University of Graz, Graz, Austria",[],{"title":566},{"VI":567},"Johann C. Marek",{"url":551,"publisher":569,"properties":611},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":570,"slug":10,"properties":571,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":575,"manageAffiliations":580,"indexDatabases":591,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":606,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":572,"title":573,"eissn":574},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[576],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":577,"label":578,"description":579,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[581,586],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":582,"slug":22,"properties":583,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":585,"statistic":22},[],{"title":584},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":587,"slug":22,"properties":588,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":590,"statistic":22},[],{"title":589},{"EN":45},[],[592,599],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":593,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":598,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":594,"label":595,"description":596,"key":57,"publicationTags":597,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":600,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":605,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":601,"label":602,"description":603,"key":75,"publicationTags":604,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":607,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":608,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":609,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":610,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":612,"volume":614},{"VOID":613},"53-61",{"VOID":525},{"total":23,"publishYear":528,"statisticByYear":616},{},"2011-01-20",[77,64],{"id":620,"createTime":621,"updateTime":622,"relativeEntities":623,"slug":624,"properties":625,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":636,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":637,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":638,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":654,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":702,"publishDate":705,"publishYear":703,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":706,"indexDatabases":707,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"2f03a097-829d-40a9-811b-b8e4dbca52e2","2024-01-28T01:44:04.056+00:00","2026-07-09T11:04:56.012+00:00",[],"Sainsbury-on-Thinking-about-Fictional-Things",{"abstract":626,"title":628,"gsPaper":630,"references":632,"doi":634},{"EN":627},"In a number of places Mark Sainsbury has recently developed an attractive irrealist account of fiction and intentionality, on which there are no fictional objects or exotic intentional entities. A central component of his account is an ambitious argument, which aims to establish that the truth of intensional transitives such as “I think about Holmes” and “Alexander feared Zeus” does not require the existence of fictional or intentional objects. It would be good news indeed for the irrealist if Sainsbury’s argument worked. However, I argue that Sainsbury’s argument fails. I conclude by considering how Sainsbury’s irrealist might explain our intuitions about such sentences, drawing upon another component of Sainsbury’s irrealism.",{"EN":629},"Sainsbury on Thinking about Fictional Things",{"VOID":631},"[\"13581297117115736019\"]",{"VOID":633},"Azzouni, J. (2010). Talking about Nothing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nBrock, S. (2002) Fictionalism about fictional characters. Nous, (36), 1–21.\nden Dikken, M., Larson, R., & Ludlow, P. (1996). Intensional “transitive” verbs and concealed complement clauses. Rivisita di linguistica, 8, 29–46.\nForbes, G. (2006). Attitude Problems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nGeach, P. (1967). Intentional identity. The Journal of Philosophy. (64), 627–32.\nLarson, R. (2002). The grammar of intensionality. In G. Preyer & G. Peter (Eds.), Logical Form and Natural Language (pp. 228–262). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nMontague, M. (2007). Against propositionalism. Nous, 41(3), 503–518.\nParsons, T. (2010). Meaning sensitivity and grammatical structure. In M. L. D. Chiar, K. Doets, D. Mundici, & J. van Benthem (Eds.), Structures and Norms in Science (pp. 369–383). Dordrecht: Kluwer.\nSainsbury, M. (2005). Reference Without Referents. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nSainsbury, M. (2009). Fiction and Fictionalism. London: Routledge.\nSainsbury, M. (2010a). Fiction and acceptance-relative truth, belief, and assertion. In F. Lihoreau (Ed.), Truth in Fiction (pp. 137–152). Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.\nSainsbury, M. (2010b). Intentionality without exotica. In R. Jeshion (Ed.), New Essays on Singular Thought (pp. 300–318). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nSalmon, N. (2005). Mythical objects. In his Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Meaning (pp. 91–107). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nTextor, M. (2010). Proper names and practices: On reference without referents. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 1(81), 105–118.\nThomasson, A. (2010). Fiction, existence and indeterminacy. In J. Woods (Ed.), Fictions and Models: New Essays (pp. 109–148). Munich: Philosophia Verlag.\nvan Inwagen, P. (2000). Quantification and fictional discourse. In A. Everett & T. Hofweber (Eds.), Empty Names, Fiction, and the Puzzles of Non-Existence (pp. 235–4). Stanford: CSLI Press.\nvan Inwagen, P. (2001). Creatures of fiction. In his Ontology, Identity, and Modality (pp. 37–56). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nvan Inwagen, P. (2003). Existence and ontological commitment. In M. Loux & D. Zimmerman (Eds.), Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (pp. 131–157). Oxford: Oxford University Press.",{"VOID":635},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-013-0209-1","2024-06-23T11:38:41.165+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-013-0209-1",[639],{"id":640,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":641,"affiliations":642,"properties":651,"displayName":653,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"b539f162-bbde-401f-b48a-bbd1d3478eed",[122],[643],{"id":644,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":645,"properties":22},"4d514daf-86cb-4390-b179-e0366cbf65a3",{"id":644,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":646,"slug":22,"properties":647,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":650,"statistic":22},[],{"title":648},{"VI":649},"Philosophy Department, University of Bristol, Bristol, UK",[],{"title":652},{"VI":653},"Anthony Everett",{"url":637,"publisher":655,"properties":697},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":656,"slug":10,"properties":657,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":661,"manageAffiliations":666,"indexDatabases":677,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":692,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":658,"title":659,"eissn":660},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[662],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":663,"label":664,"description":665,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[667,672],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":668,"slug":22,"properties":669,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":671,"statistic":22},[],{"title":670},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":673,"slug":22,"properties":674,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":676,"statistic":22},[],{"title":675},{"EN":45},[],[678,685],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":679,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":684,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":680,"label":681,"description":682,"key":57,"publicationTags":683,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":686,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":691,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":687,"label":688,"description":689,"key":75,"publicationTags":690,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":693,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":694,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":695,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":696,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":698,"volume":700},{"VOID":699},"181-194",{"VOID":701},"29",{"total":23,"publishYear":703,"statisticByYear":704},2013,{},"2013-09-29","2026-07-09T11:04:56.011+00:00",[77,64],{"id":709,"createTime":710,"updateTime":711,"relativeEntities":712,"slug":713,"properties":714,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":725,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":726,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":727,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":743,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":791,"publishYear":792,"citationAnalyzeStatus":793,"lastCitationAnalyze":711,"indexDatabases":794,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"d46bc219-a3f1-46b7-8130-8fb8018c705f","2024-01-10T17:00:08.970+00:00","2026-06-13T10:40:44.441+00:00",[],"Bergmann-s-Dilemma-and-Internalism-s-Escape",{"abstract":715,"title":717,"gsPaper":719,"references":721,"doi":723},{"EN":716},"Michael Bergmann has argued that internalist accounts of justification face an insoluble dilemma. This paper begins with an explanation of Bergmann’s dilemma. Next, I review some recent attempts to answer the dilemma, which I argue are insufficient to overcome it. The solution I propose presents an internalist account of justification through direct acquaintance. My thesis is that direct acquaintance can provide subjective epistemic assurance without falling prey to the quagmire of difficulties that Bergmann alleges all internalist accounts of justification cannot surmount.",{"EN":718},"Bergmann’s Dilemma and Internalism’s Escape",{"VOID":720},"[]",{"VOID":722},"Bergmann, M. (2006a). Justification without awareness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nBergmann, M. (2006b). A dilemma for internalism. In T. M. Crisp, M. Davidson, and D. Vander Laan (Eds.), Knowledge and reality: Essays in honor of Alvin Plantinga (pp. 137–177). Philosophical Studies Series 103. Dordrecht: Springer.\nBonJour, L. (1985). Structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.\nBonJour, L. (2003). A version of internalist strong foundationalism. In L. BonJour & E. Sosa, Epistemic justification (pp. 3–96). Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.\nCarroll, L. (1895). What the Tortoise said to Achilles. Mind, 4(14), 278–280.\nConee, E. (2004). First things first. In E. Conee & R. Feldman (Eds.), Evidentialism: Essays in epistemology (pp. 11–36). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nCrisp, T. (2010). A dilemma for internalism? Synthese, 174(3), 355–366.\nDePoe, J. (2011). Defeating the self-defeat argument for phenomenal conservatism. Philosophical Studies, 152(3), 347–359.\nFumerton, R. (1995). Metaepistemology and skepticism. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.\nFumerton, R. (2008). Epistemic conservativism: theft or honest toil? In T. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (Eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology (pp. 63–86). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nGoldman, A. (1979). What is justified true belief? In G. S. Pappas (Ed.), Justification and knowledge (pp. 1–23). Dodrecht: D. Reidel.\nHasan, A. (2011). Escaping Bergmann’s dilemma for internalism. Journal of Philosophical Research, 36, 391–410.\nHasan, A. (forthcoming). Phenomenal conservatism, classical foundationalism, and internalist justification. Philosophical Studies.\nHetherington, S. (1990). Internalism’s dilemma. American Philosophical Quarterly, 27(3), 245–251.\nHuemer, M. (2001). Skepticism and the veil of perception. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.\nHuemer, M. (2007). Compassionate phenomenal conservatism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 74(1), 30–55.\nLehrer, K. (2000). Theory of knowledge (2d ed.). Boulder: Westview.\nMoser, P. K. (1985). Empirical justification. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.\nNozick, R. (1981). Philosophical explanations. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press.\nPlantinga, A. (1993). Warrant and proper function. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nRogers, J., & Matheson, J. (2011). Bergmann’s dilemma: exit strategies for internalists. Philosophical Studies, 152(1), 55–580.\nRussell, B. (1910). Knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 11, 108–128.\nRussell, B. (1912). Problems of philosophy. Reprint 1997, John Perry (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nSteup, M. (2004). Internalist reliabilism. Philosophical Issues, 14, 403–425.",{"VOID":724},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-012-0154-4","2024-06-23T08:57:51.359+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-012-0154-4",[728],{"id":729,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":730,"affiliations":731,"properties":740,"displayName":742,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"a487f548-a4ea-4e32-a2f6-1449c656d34c",[122],[732],{"id":733,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":734,"properties":22},"d46cef13-a5c2-492f-9bac-58d70a755a26",{"id":733,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":735,"slug":22,"properties":736,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":739,"statistic":22},[],{"title":737},{"VI":738},"Marywood University, Scranton, USA",[],{"title":741},{"VI":742},"John M. DePoe",{"url":726,"publisher":744,"properties":786},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":745,"slug":10,"properties":746,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":750,"manageAffiliations":755,"indexDatabases":766,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":781,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":747,"title":748,"eissn":749},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[751],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":752,"label":753,"description":754,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[756,761],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":757,"slug":22,"properties":758,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":760,"statistic":22},[],{"title":759},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":762,"slug":22,"properties":763,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":765,"statistic":22},[],{"title":764},{"EN":45},[],[767,774],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":768,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":773,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":769,"label":770,"description":771,"key":57,"publicationTags":772,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":775,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":780,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":776,"label":777,"description":778,"key":75,"publicationTags":779,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":782,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":783,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":784,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":785,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":787,"volume":789},{"VOID":788},"409-423",{"VOID":790},"27","2012-03-03",2012,"ERROR_IN_GET_PLATFORM_ID",[77,64],{"id":796,"createTime":797,"updateTime":798,"relativeEntities":799,"slug":800,"properties":801,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":810,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":811,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":812,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":828,"citationCount":23,"citationInfo":876,"publishDate":879,"publishYear":877,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":880,"indexDatabases":881,"openAccess":22,"references":882,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"631c7366-6465-41c4-8005-906f5e5f52bd","2024-01-15T01:31:58.032+00:00","2026-05-07T04:27:01.251+00:00",[],"Negative-Properties-Negative-Objects-",{"abstract":802,"title":804,"gsPaper":806,"doi":808},{"EN":803},"This paper starts with the presentation of an Aristotelian theory of negative properties. Against this backdrop, it then asks whether there could be objects that have solely negative properties, i.e., completely negative objects. This possibility is entertained by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. The notion of a completely negative object is compared to the concepts of a nonexistent object, a nonconcrete (abstract) object, and a nonactual (merely possible) object. Ultimately, it is argued that there can be no completely negative objects, because all negative properties entail some positive properties.",{"EN":805},"Negative Properties—Negative Objects?",{"VOID":807},"[\"9586762093623051082\"]",{"VOID":809},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-018-0341-z","2024-04-29T21:51:24.667+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-018-0341-z",[813],{"id":814,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":815,"affiliations":816,"properties":825,"displayName":827,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"20fa5578-db1d-4911-b7f7-53fcb249fb09",[122],[817],{"id":818,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":819,"properties":22},"757091d3-d929-444d-af8d-049de9d30af7",{"id":818,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":820,"slug":22,"properties":821,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":824,"statistic":22},[],{"title":822},{"VI":823},"Department of Philosophy, Heinrich Heine University, Düsseldorf, Germany",[],{"title":826},{"VI":827},"David Hommen",{"url":811,"publisher":829,"properties":871},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":830,"slug":10,"properties":831,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":835,"manageAffiliations":840,"indexDatabases":851,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":866,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":832,"title":833,"eissn":834},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[836],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":837,"label":838,"description":839,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[841,846],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":842,"slug":22,"properties":843,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":845,"statistic":22},[],{"title":844},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":847,"slug":22,"properties":848,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":850,"statistic":22},[],{"title":849},{"EN":45},[],[852,859],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":853,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":858,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":854,"label":855,"description":856,"key":57,"publicationTags":857,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":860,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":865,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":861,"label":862,"description":863,"key":75,"publicationTags":864,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":867,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":868,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":869,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":870,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":872,"volume":874},{"VOID":873},"395-412",{"VOID":875},"33",{"total":23,"publishYear":877,"statisticByYear":878},2018,{},"2018-02-08","2026-05-07T04:27:01.250+00:00",[77,64],[883,886,889,892,895,898,901,904,907,910,913,916,919,922,925,931,934,941,944,947,950,953,960,964,968,972,975,982,986],{"id":279,"text":884,"url":281,"identifiers":885},"Alexander of Aphrodisias. (2014). On Aristotle metaphysics 5. Translated by E. W. Dooley. London\u002FNew Dehli\u002FNew York\u002FSydney: Bloomsbury.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":887,"url":281,"identifiers":888},"Aristotle. (1995a). Categories. Translated by J. L. Ackrill. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":890,"url":281,"identifiers":891},"Aristotle. (1995b). Metaphysics. Translated by W. D. Ross. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":893,"url":281,"identifiers":894},"Aristotle. (1995c). Physics. Translated by R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":896,"url":281,"identifiers":897},"Aristotle. (1995d). Prior analytics. Translated by A. J. Jenkinson. In J. Barnes (Ed.), The complete works of Aristotle. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":899,"url":281,"identifiers":900},"Armstrong, D. M. (1989). A combinatorial theory of possibility. Cambridge\u002FPort Chester\u002FMelbourne\u002FSydney: Cambridge University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":902,"url":22,"identifiers":903},"Bigelow, J. C. (1988). Real possibilities. Philosophical Studies, 53, 37–64.",{},{"id":279,"text":905,"url":281,"identifiers":906},"Blanco Salgueiro, A. (1998). Holism and dependency among properties. Logica Trianguli, 2, 17–30.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":908,"url":281,"identifiers":909},"Coope, U. (2009). Change and its relation to actuality and potentiality. In G. Anagnostopoulos (Ed.), A companion to Aristotle (pp. 277–291). Malden, MA\u002FChichester, UK: Wiley-Blackwell.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":911,"url":281,"identifiers":912},"Efird, D., & Stoneham, T. (2010). The subtraction argument for the possibility of free mass. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 80(1), 50–57.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":914,"url":281,"identifiers":915},"Gale, R. M. (1976). Negation and non-being. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":917,"url":281,"identifiers":918},"Harris, R. (2010). Do material things have intrinsic properties? Metaphysica, 11(2), 105–117.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":920,"url":281,"identifiers":921},"Hommen, D. (2013). Negative properties, real and irreducible. Philosophia Naturalis 50(2), 383–406.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":923,"url":281,"identifiers":924},"Hommen, D. (2016). Absences as latent potentialities. Philosophical Papers 45(3), 401–435.",{"doi":283},{"id":926,"text":927,"url":928,"identifiers":929},"05d1e8e2-66d2-4cf6-b25a-1b1d342d3faa","Hommen, D. (2017). Making sense of negative properties. Axiomathes (Online First).","http:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002F10.1007\u002Fs10516-017-9337-3",{"doi":930},"10.1007\u002Fs10516-017-9337-3",{"id":22,"text":932,"url":22,"identifiers":933},"Horn, L. R. (2001). A natural history of negation. Stanford: CSLI Publications.",{},{"id":935,"text":936,"url":937,"identifiers":938},"1a14babf-9a17-4aee-9f6a-4c809053a7e4","Lewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. London\u002FNew York: Basil Blackwell.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.goodreads.com\u002Fbook\u002Fshow\u002F221531.On_the_Plurality_of_Worlds",{"isbn":939,"isbn13":940},"0631224262","9780631224266",{"id":22,"text":942,"url":22,"identifiers":943},"Meinong, A. (1915). Über Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit. Beiträge zur Gegenstandstheorie und Erkenntnistheorie. Leibzig: Johann Ambrosius Barth.",{},{"id":279,"text":945,"url":281,"identifiers":946},"Meinong, A. (1960). The theory of objects. In R. Chisholm (Ed.), Realism and the background of phenomenology (pp. 76–117). Glencoe: Free Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":948,"url":22,"identifiers":949},"Parsons, T. (1980). Nonexistent objects. New Haven: Yale University Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":951,"url":281,"identifiers":952},"Plantinga, A. (1974). The nature of necessity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":954,"text":955,"url":956,"identifiers":957},"f473e65c-4171-4a42-9632-1eea248f0d3b","Proops, I. (2013). Wittgenstein’s logical atomism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Summer 2013 ed.). https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Fsum2013\u002Fentries\u002Fwittgenstein-atomism\u002F. Cited 22 Sep 2017.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.goodreads.com\u002Fbook\u002Fshow\u002F385321.Wittgenstein_s_Logical_Atomism",{"isbn":958,"isbn13":959},"1855065363","9781855065369",{"id":22,"text":961,"url":962,"identifiers":963},"Reicher, M. (2016). Nonexistent objects. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Winter 2016 ed.). https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Fwin2016\u002Fentries\u002Fnonexistent- objects\u002F. Cited 22 Sep 2017.","https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Fwin2016\u002Fentries\u002Fnonexistent-objects\u002F",{},{"id":22,"text":965,"url":966,"identifiers":967},"Rosen, G. (2017). Abstract objects. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Spring 2017 ed.). https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Fspr2017\u002Fentries\u002Fabstract-objects\u002F. Cited 22 Sep 2017.","https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Fspr2017\u002Fentries\u002Fabstract-objects\u002F",{},{"id":22,"text":969,"url":970,"identifiers":971},"Sachs, J. (2005). Aristotle: Motion and its place in nature. In The Internet encyclopedia of philosophy. http:\u002F\u002Fwww.iep.utm.edu\u002Faris-mot\u002F. Cited 22 Sep 2017.","http:\u002F\u002Fwww.iep.utm.edu\u002Faris-mot\u002F",{},{"id":279,"text":973,"url":281,"identifiers":974},"Schaffer, J. (2003). The problem of free mass: Must properties cluster? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 66(1), 125–138.",{"doi":283},{"id":976,"text":977,"url":978,"identifiers":979},"55314473-df4d-4336-988e-ea9ccbd0895d","Wittgenstein, L. (1974). Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Translated by D. F. Pears and B. McGuinness. London\u002FNew York: Routledge & Kegan Paul.","https:\u002F\u002Fwww.goodreads.com\u002Fbook\u002Fshow\u002F237858.Tractatus_Logico_Philosophicus",{"isbn":980,"isbn13":981},"041505186X","9780415051866",{"id":22,"text":983,"url":984,"identifiers":985},"Yagisawa, T. (2014). Possible objects. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2014 ed.). https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Ffall2014\u002Fentries\u002Fpossible-ob jects\u002F. Cited 22 Sep 2017.","https:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Ffall2014\u002Fentries\u002Fpossible-objects\u002F",{},{"id":279,"text":987,"url":281,"identifiers":988},"Zalta, E. N. (1983). Abstract objects. An introduction to axiomatic metaphysics. Dordrecht\u002FBoston\u002FLancaster: D. Reidel Publishing Company.",{"doi":283},{"id":990,"createTime":991,"updateTime":992,"relativeEntities":993,"slug":994,"properties":995,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":1005,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":1006,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":1007,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":1023,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":1071,"publishYear":1072,"citationAnalyzeStatus":793,"lastCitationAnalyze":1073,"indexDatabases":1074,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"1d940bc2-16d2-48b4-80d7-6ea5753d72eb","2024-02-12T01:11:13.294+00:00","2026-02-18T05:11:07.293+00:00",[],"Approximate-Truth-Quasi-Factivity-and-Evidence",{"abstract":996,"title":998,"gsPaper":1000,"references":1001,"doi":1003},{"EN":997},"The main question addressed in this paper is whether some false sentences can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. In this paper it is argued that there are good reasons to suspect that at least some false propositions can (at least some times) constitute evidence for the truth of certain other contingent propositions. The paper also introduces a novel condition concerning propositions that constitute evidence that explains a ubiquitous evidential practice and it contains a defense of a particular condition concerning the possession of evidence. The core position adopted here then is that false propositions that are approximately true reports of measurements can constitute evidence for the truth of other propositions. So, it will be argued that evidence is only quasi-factive in this very specific sense.",{"EN":999},"Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence",{"VOID":720},{"VOID":1002},"Bird, A. (2004). Is evidence non-inferential? The Philosophical Quarterly, 54, 252–256.\nFantl, J., & McGrath, M. (2009). Knowledge in an uncertain world. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nFranklin, A. (1997). Millikan’s oil-drop experiments. The Chemical Educator, 2, 1–14.\nHawthorne, J. (2004). Knowledge and lotteries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nHawthorne, J., & Stanley, J. (2008). Knowledge and action. The Journal of Philosophy, 105, 571–590.\nHilpinen, R. (1976). Approximate truth and truthlikeness. In M. Przelecki, et al., Formal methods in the methodology of the empirical sciences (pp. 19–42). Dordrecht: D. Reidel.\nHilpinen, R. (1988). Knowledge and conditionals. Philosophical Perspective, 2, 157–180.\nHyman, J. (2006). Knowledge and evidence. Mind, 115, 891–916.\nKuipers, T. (1978). What is closer-to-the-truth? Amsterdam: Rodopi.\nLeite, A. (2013). But that’s not evidence; it’s not even true! The Philosophical Quarterly, 63, 81–104.\nLittlejohn, C. (2011). Evidence and knowledge. Erkenntnis, 74, 241–262.\nLittlejohn, C. (2013). No evidence is false. Acta Analytica, 28, 145–159.\nOddie, G. (1986). Likeness to truth. Dordrecht: D. Reidel.\nOddie, G. (2008). Truthlikeness. The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (fall 2008 edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). http:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Ffall2008\u002Fentries\u002Ftruthlikeness\u002F. Accessed 15 October 2014.\nRizzieri, A. (2011). Evidence does not equal knowledge. Philosophical Studies, 153, 235–242.\nSchroeder, M. (2011). What does it take to have a reason? In A. Reisner & A. Steglicj-Petersen (Eds.), Reasons for belief (pp. 201–222). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.\nShaffer, M. (2012a). E does not equal K. The Reasoner, 7, 30–31.\nShaffer, M. (2012b). Not-exact-truths, pragmatic encroachment and the epistemic norm of practical reasoning. Logos & Episteme, 3, 239–259.\nShaffer, M. (2012c). Moorean sentences and the norm of assertion. Logos & Episteme, 3, 653–658.\nShaffer, M. (2012d). Counterfactuals and scientific realism. New York: Palgrave-MacMillan.\nUnger, P. (1975). Ignorance. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nWilliamson, T. (2000). Knowledge and its limits. Oxford: Oxford University Press.\nWilliamson, T. (2005). Contextualism, subject-sensitive invariantism and knowledge of knowledge. The Philosophical Quarterly, 55, 213–235.\nWilliamson, T. (2007). The philosophy of philosophy. London: Blackwell.\nWilliamson, T. (2009). Replies to critics. In P. Greenough & D. Pritchard (Eds.), Williamson on knowledge (pp. 279–385). New York: Oxford University Press.",{"VOID":1004},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-014-0245-5","2024-05-12T10:39:39.302+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-014-0245-5",[1008],{"id":1009,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":1010,"affiliations":1011,"properties":1020,"displayName":1022,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"8b55bb8c-c9c4-4a06-9e67-a28a58a8b7c0",[122],[1012],{"id":1013,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1014,"properties":22},"c33ceee9-be03-4fd3-9fcf-f5244f711f88",{"id":1013,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1015,"slug":22,"properties":1016,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1019,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1017},{"VI":1018},"Department of Philosophy, St. Cloud State University, St. Cloud, USA",[],{"title":1021},{"VI":1022},"Michael J. Shaffer",{"url":1006,"publisher":1024,"properties":1066},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1025,"slug":10,"properties":1026,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1030,"manageAffiliations":1035,"indexDatabases":1046,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1061,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1027,"title":1028,"eissn":1029},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1031],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1032,"label":1033,"description":1034,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1036,1041],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1037,"slug":22,"properties":1038,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1040,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1039},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1042,"slug":22,"properties":1043,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1045,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1044},{"EN":45},[],[1047,1054],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1048,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":1053,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1049,"label":1050,"description":1051,"key":57,"publicationTags":1052,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1055,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1060,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1056,"label":1057,"description":1058,"key":75,"publicationTags":1059,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1062,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1063,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1064,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1065,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":1067,"volume":1069},{"VOID":1068},"249-266",{"VOID":1070},"30","2015-01-04",2015,"2026-02-18T05:11:07.292+00:00",[77,64],{"id":1076,"createTime":1077,"updateTime":1078,"relativeEntities":1079,"slug":1080,"properties":1081,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":1090,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":1091,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":1092,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":1108,"citationCount":1156,"citationInfo":1157,"publishDate":1160,"publishYear":1158,"citationAnalyzeStatus":21,"lastCitationAnalyze":1161,"indexDatabases":1162,"openAccess":22,"references":1163,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"272e6ea4-6120-4eba-8073-fda0a39c9999","2024-01-26T20:43:37.459+00:00","2026-02-02T05:40:20.088+00:00",[],"Boundary-in-context",{"abstract":1082,"title":1084,"gsPaper":1086,"doi":1088},{"EN":1083},"A contextualist account of modal assertions is sketched that makes their truth sensitive to the presuppositions of the conversation. Support for the account is mustered by considering its application to the context-sensitivity of assertions of subjunctive conditional sentences, explanation sentences, and knowledge sentences.",{"EN":1085},"Boundary in context",{"VOID":1087},"[\"7415657997739161342\"]",{"VOID":1089},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-005-1003-5","2024-05-03T16:53:33.043+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-005-1003-5",[1093],{"id":1094,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":1095,"affiliations":1096,"properties":1105,"displayName":1107,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"8e8b04eb-fa74-4b80-97cf-8f80e9e17bf9",[122],[1097],{"id":1098,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1099,"properties":22},"47d6ccaa-2774-4a7c-90ad-e0d72692269b",{"id":1098,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1100,"slug":22,"properties":1101,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1104,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1102},{"VI":1103},"Department of Philosophy and Religion, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, USA",[],{"title":1106},{"VI":1107},"John W. Carroll",{"url":1091,"publisher":1109,"properties":1151},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1110,"slug":10,"properties":1111,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1115,"manageAffiliations":1120,"indexDatabases":1131,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1146,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1112,"title":1113,"eissn":1114},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1116],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1117,"label":1118,"description":1119,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1121,1126],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1122,"slug":22,"properties":1123,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1125,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1124},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1127,"slug":22,"properties":1128,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1130,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1129},{"EN":45},[],[1132,1139],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1133,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":1138,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1134,"label":1135,"description":1136,"key":57,"publicationTags":1137,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1140,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1145,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1141,"label":1142,"description":1143,"key":75,"publicationTags":1144,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1147,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1148,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1149,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1150,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":1152,"volume":1154},{"VOID":1153},"43-54",{"VOID":1155},"20",4,{"total":1156,"publishYear":1158,"statisticByYear":1159},2005,{},"2005-03-01","2026-02-02T05:40:20.087+00:00",[77],[1164,1167,1170,1173,1176,1179,1182,1185,1191,1194,1197,1200,1203,1206,1209,1212,1215,1218,1221,1224],{"id":22,"text":1165,"url":22,"identifiers":1166},"Chierchia, G. and McConnell-Ginet, S. 1990: Meaning and Grammar. Cambridge: MIT Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":1168,"url":281,"identifiers":1169},"Chisholm, R. 1955: “Law Statements and Counterfactual Inference” Analysis 15, 97–105.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":1171,"url":281,"identifiers":1172},"Cohen, S. 1986: “Knowledge and Context” Journal of Philosophy 83, 574–583.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":1174,"url":281,"identifiers":1175},"Cohen, S. 1988: “How to be a Fallibilist” Philosophical Perspectives 2, 91–123.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":1177,"url":22,"identifiers":1178},"DeRose, K. 1992: “Contextualism and Knowledge Attributions” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52, 913–929.",{},{"id":279,"text":1180,"url":281,"identifiers":1181},"DeRose, K. 1995: “Solving The Skeptical Problem” Philosophical Review 104, 1–52.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":1183,"url":22,"identifiers":1184},"Goodman, N. 1983: Fact, Fiction, and Forecast. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.",{},{"id":1186,"text":1187,"url":1188,"identifiers":1189},"6c8d1a74-22f4-431d-a095-f5e5fbc0aaed","Hawthorne, J. 2001: “Freedom in Context” Philosophical Studies 104, 63–79.","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1023\u002FA:1010398805497",{"doi":1190},"10.1023\u002FA:1010398805497",{"id":279,"text":1192,"url":281,"identifiers":1193},"Heller, M. 1999: “The Proper Role for Contextualism in an Anti-Luck Epistemology” Philosophical Perspectives 13, 115–129.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":1195,"url":22,"identifiers":1196},"Lewis, D. 1983: Philosophical Papers, Volume 1. New York: Oxford University Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":1198,"url":281,"identifiers":1199},"Lewis, D. 1986: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. New York: Oxford University Press.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":1201,"url":22,"identifiers":1202},"Lewis, D. 1996: “Elusive Knowledge” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74, 549–567.",{},{"id":22,"text":1204,"url":22,"identifiers":1205},"Menzies, P. 2004: “Difference-Making in Context” Causation and Counterfactuals, J. Collins, N. Hall, and L. Paul (eds.). Cambridge: MIT Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":1207,"url":281,"identifiers":1208},"Neta, R. 2003: “Contextualism and the Problem of the External World” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66, 1–31.",{"doi":283},{"id":22,"text":1210,"url":22,"identifiers":1211},"Stalnaker, R. 1999: Context and Content. Oxford: Oxford University Press.",{},{"id":22,"text":1213,"url":22,"identifiers":1214},"Unger, P. 1986: “The Cone Model of Knowledge” Philosophical Topics 14, 125–178.",{},{"id":22,"text":1216,"url":22,"identifiers":1217},"van Fraassen, B. 1980: The Scientific Image. Oxford: Clarendon Press.",{},{"id":22,"text":1219,"url":22,"identifiers":1220},"von Fintel, K. 2001: “Counterfactuals in a Dynamic Context” Ken Hale: A Life in Language, M. Kenstowicz (ed.). Cambridge: MIT Press.",{},{"id":279,"text":1222,"url":281,"identifiers":1223},"Warmbrōd, K. 1981: “An Indexical Theory of Conditionals” Dialogue 20, 644–664.",{"doi":283},{"id":279,"text":1225,"url":281,"identifiers":1226},"Woodward, J. 1984: “A Theory of Singular Causal Explanation” Erkenntnis 21, 231–262.",{"doi":283},{"id":1228,"createTime":1229,"updateTime":1230,"relativeEntities":1231,"slug":1232,"properties":1233,"entityType":113,"verifyStatus":114,"verifyTime":1243,"verifyNote":116,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"primaryUrl":1244,"fullTextUrl":22,"authors":1245,"publicationType":137,"publisherRelationship":1261,"citationCount":22,"citationInfo":22,"publishDate":1309,"publishYear":1310,"citationAnalyzeStatus":793,"lastCitationAnalyze":1230,"indexDatabases":1311,"openAccess":22,"references":22,"isForceReanalyzing":189},"97019811-a88b-463e-80a9-abaa48ff2907","2024-01-11T02:22:32.664+00:00","2026-01-17T10:20:49.383+00:00",[],"Existence-and-Strong-Uncountability",{"abstract":1234,"title":1236,"gsPaper":1238,"references":1239,"doi":1241},{"EN":1235},"On the standard view for something to exist is for one thing to exist: in slogan form, to be is to be countable (cf. van Inwagen 2009). E.J. Lowe (2009, 2003, 1998) argues something can exist without being countable as one, however. His primary example is homogenous “stuff,” i.e., qualitatively uniform and infinitely divisible matter. Lacking nonarbitrary boundaries and being everywhere the same, homogenous stuff lacks a principle of individuation that would yield countably distinct constituents. So, for Lowe, homogenous stuff is strongly uncountable. Olson (2011) rejects Lowe’s view and defends the orthodox connection between existence and number. He argues that if there is any stuff, there is a (determinate) number of portions of stuff. Sider (2011, 2001) also rejects a stuff ontology, claiming it is incompatible with his preferred view that the familiar quantifiers of predicate logic carve at nature’s joints. Against these arguments, I defend the uncountability of stuff and the possibility of existence without countability. If to be is to be countable, more is needed than the arguments that Olson and Sider provide.",{"EN":1237},"Existence and Strong Uncountability",{"VOID":720},{"VOID":1240},"Chakravartty, A. (2015). Scientific realism. In E. N. Zalta (Ed.), The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2015 Edition). URL = http:\u002F\u002Fplato.stanford.edu\u002Farchives\u002Ffall2015\u002Fentries\u002Fscientific-realism\u002F.\nFrege, G. (1960). (1884\u002F1960): The foundations of arithmetic (2nd ed.). New York: Translated by J.L. Austin. Harper and Row.\nFrost-Arnold, G. (2010). The no-miracles argument for realism: inference to an unacceptable explanation. Philosophy of Science, 77, 35–58.\nHirsch, E. (2002). Quantifier variance and realism. Philosophical Issues, 12(1), 51–73.\nHorgan, T., & Potrc, M. (2000). Blobjectivism and indirect correspondence. Facta Philosophica, 2, 248–270.\nHume, D. (1779). Dialogues concerning natural religion.\nKorman, D. (2010). The argument from vagueness. Philosophy Compass, 5(10), 891–901.\nKukla, A. (1998). Studies in scientific realism. New York: Oxford University Press.\nLadyman, J., & Ross, D. (2009). Every thing must go. Oxford University Press.\nLewis, D. (1986). On the plurality of worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.\nLowe, E. J. (1998). The possibility of metaphysics. Oxford University Press.\nLowe, E. J. (2003). Identity, individuality, and unity. Philosophy, 78(305), 321–336.\nLowe, E. J. (2009). More kinds of being. Oxford: Wiley.\nMarkosian, N. (2015). The right stuff. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 93(4), 665–687.\nMizrahi, M. (2012). Why the ultimate argument for scientific realism ultimately fails. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, Part A, 43(1), 132–138.\nOlson, E. (2011). Identity, quantification, and number. In T. Tahko (Ed.), Contemporary Aristotelian metaphysics (pp. 66–82). Cambridge University Press.\nPutnam, H. (1975). Mathematics, matter and method. Cambridge University Press.\nSider, T. (2001). Four dimensionalism. Oxford University Press.\nSider, T. (2011). Writing the book of the world. Oxford University Press.\nVan Inwagen, P. (2009). Being, existence, and ontological commitment. In D. Chalmers, D. Manley, and R. Wasserman (Eds.), Metametaphysics: new essays on the foundations of ontology (pp. 472–506). Oxford University Press.",{"VOID":1242},"10.1007\u002Fs12136-016-0314-z","2024-05-07T03:05:58.771+00:00","https:\u002F\u002Flink.springer.com\u002Farticle\u002F10.1007\u002Fs12136-016-0314-z",[1246],{"id":1247,"sortIndex":23,"researcher":22,"roles":1248,"affiliations":1249,"properties":1258,"displayName":1260,"givenName":22,"familyName":22},"4fbe5eff-efd8-4f31-9ebd-4ab47f4ed1e4",[122],[1250],{"id":1251,"sortIndex":23,"affiliation":1252,"properties":22},"a74ee107-7b77-4073-be13-facdb2f85027",{"id":1251,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1253,"slug":22,"properties":1254,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1257,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1255},{"VI":1256},"College of William & Mary, Williamsburg, USA",[],{"title":1259},{"VI":1260},"Jonah P. B. Goldwater",{"url":1244,"publisher":1262,"properties":1304},{"id":6,"createTime":7,"updateTime":8,"relativeEntities":1263,"slug":10,"properties":1264,"entityType":20,"verifyStatus":21,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":23,"subjectFields":1268,"manageAffiliations":1273,"indexDatabases":1284,"url":22,"thumbnailPath":22,"statistic":1299,"gsStatistic":22,"type":91,"analyzePriority":22},[],{"issn":1265,"title":1266,"eissn":1267},{"VOID":15},{"EN":17},{"VOID":13},[1269],{"id":26,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1270,"label":1271,"description":1272,"parentId":22,"standard":22,"scholarHubFieldId":22},[],{"EN":29},{},[1274,1279],{"id":33,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1275,"slug":22,"properties":1276,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1278,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1277},{"EN":37},[39],{"id":41,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1280,"slug":22,"properties":1281,"entityType":22,"verifyStatus":22,"verifyTime":22,"verifyNote":22,"languages":22,"translateLanguages":22,"viewCount":22,"url":22,"parentIds":1283,"statistic":22},[],{"title":1282},{"EN":45},[],[1285,1292],{"id":49,"indexDatabase":1286,"url":60,"indexYears":61,"academicFieldIds":1291,"indexDatabaseRanking":64},{"id":51,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1287,"label":1288,"description":1289,"key":57,"publicationTags":1290,"standard":22},[],{"EN":54,"VI":54},{"EN":54,"VI":56},[59],[63],{"id":66,"indexDatabase":1293,"url":79,"indexYears":22,"academicFieldIds":1298,"indexDatabaseRanking":22},{"id":68,"createTime":22,"updateTime":22,"relativeEntities":1294,"label":1295,"description":1296,"key":75,"publicationTags":1297,"standard":22},[],{"EN":71,"VI":71},{"EN":73,"VI":74},[77,78],[81],{"impactFactor":23,"impactFactorByYear":1300,"i10Index":23,"i10IndexLast5Year":23,"totalPublication":84,"totalPublicationByYear":1301,"totalCitation":23,"totalCitationByYear":1302,"totalCitationPerPublication":23,"totalCitationPerPublicationByYear":1303,"hindexLast5Year":23,"hindex":23},{},{"2002":86,"2007":86,"2014":86,"2019":87,"2020":86,"2021":86,"2024":88},{},{},{"pages":1305,"volume":1307},{"VOID":1306},"321-331",{"VOID":1308},"32","2016-11-30",2016,[77,64]]