On Curing Political Diseases: The Healing Power of Majoritarian Elections in Multi-Member Districts

Homo Oeconomicus
Reiner Eichenberger1, Patricia Schafer1
1University of Fribourg, Bd. de Pérolles 90, 1700, Fribourg, Switzerland

Tóm tắt

AbstractDemocratic politics suffers from numerous diseases such as lack of inclusiveness, time-inconsistency, short-termism, negative campaigning, lack of trust in and between governments, and many more. These diseases affect all countries, albeit to a differing extent. How can they be cured? From a politico-economic perspective, an institutional approach is required. We look at a country where these political diseases seem to play a relatively minor role: Switzerland. So far, Switzerland is renowned for its extensive direct democracy and federalism. However, its electoral system has been largely neglected. It uniquely combines proportional representation and majoritarian elections on all government levels. In contrast to the international standard, Swiss majority votes do not take place in single-member districts but in multi-member districts. We analyze how the interplay of majoritarian elections in multi-member districts and proportional representation mitigates many of the political diseases.

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